Bud Allen v. Utah Public Servie Commission and Questar Gas : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2006
Bud Allen v. Utah Public Servie Commission and
Questar Gas : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Janet I. Jenson; Jenson Stavros and Guelker; Attorney for Petitioners; Mark Shurtleff; Attorney
General; Reed T. Warnick; Assistant Attorney General; Paul H. Proctor; Assistant Attorney General;
Attorneys for Utah Committee of Consumer Services.
C. Scott Brown; Collen Larkin Bell; Questar Gas Company; Gregor B. Monson; Richard R. Hall;
Stoel Rives LLP; Attorneys for Respondent Questar Gas Company; Sander J. Mooy; Public Service
Commission; Attorney for Respondent Public Service Commission of Utah.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Allen v. Questar Gas, No. 20060279.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2622
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BUD ALLEN, et ai., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION and QUESTAR GAS 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20060279-SC (consolidated) 
Agency Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-
09, 04-057-11, 04-057-13, 05-057-01 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT QUESTAR GAS COMPANY 
Petition for Review of a Final Report and Order of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
JANET I. JENSON (4226) 
JENSON STAVROS & GUELKER 
350 South 400 East, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Petitioners Bud Allen, et al. 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
REED T. WARNICK (3391) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PAUL H. PROCTOR (2657) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
500 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Utah Committee of Consumer 
Services 
C. SCOTT BROWN (4802) 
COLLEEN LARKIN BELL (5253) 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY 
180 East First South 
P.O. Box 45360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
GREGORY B. MONSON (2294) 
RICHARD R. HALL (9856) 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent Que star Gas 
Company 
SANDER J. MOOY (2309) 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
400 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Respona 
Commission of Utah 
ity, u i mill
 FlL 
Attorney for Respondent Putm^A^p^ • ._. 
-
 LLATE coun-tec o5 2006 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BUD ALLEN, et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION and QUESTAR GAS 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20060279-SC (consolidated) 
Agency Docket Nos. 04-057-04, 04-057-
09, 04-057-11, 04-057-13, 05-057-01 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT QUESTAR GAS COMPANY 
Petition for Review of a Final Report and Order of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
JANET I. JENSON (4226) 
JENSON STAVROS & GUELKER 
350 South 400 East, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Petitioners Bud Allen, et al. 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
REED T. WARNICK (3391) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PAUL H. PROCTOR (2657) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
500 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Utah Committee of Consumer 
Services 
C. SCOTT BROWN (4802) 
COLLEEN LARKIN BELL (5253) 
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY 
180 East First South 
P.O. Box 45360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
GREGORY B. MONSON (2294) 
RICHARD R. HALL (9856) 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent Questar Gas 
Company 
SANDER J. MOOY (2309) 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
400 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Respondent Public Service 
Commission of Utah 
ADDITIONAL PARTIES 
In addition to Questar Gas Company ("Questar Gas" or the "Company"), 
additional parties to the Public Service Commission of Utah (the "Commission") 
proceeding below were the Utah Division of Public Utilities (the "Division") and the 
Utah Committee of Consumer Services (the "Committee"). Petitioners did not participate 
as parties to the proceeding below.1 The Commission is a party to this appeal. 
1
 Although Questar Gas recognizes the Court's typical preference to refer to 
parties by name, for convenience in this case Questar Gas will refer to the 55 petitioners 
collectively as "Petitioners," except where the identification of a particular petitioner is 
appropriate. Roger Ball and Claire Geddes are the only Petitioners in Case 
No. 20060280-SC consolidated in this appeal. They are the lead Petitioners in Case 
No. 20060279-SC. They originally filed form statements in support for their Request to 
Intervene in the proceeding before the Commission from most of the 53 other Petitioners 
and others. Record ("R.") 337-678. After the Commission denied them intervention, 
they apparently recruited the other Petitioners to join them in seeking reconsideration of 
the order of the Commission. R. 1156. Therefore, Questar Gas will sometimes refer to 
Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes separately from the other Petitioners. Questar Gas accepts the 
identification of the Petitioners set forth in the List of Parties on page 2 of Petitioners' 
Brief. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court does not have jurisdiction in this case because Petitioners lacked 
standing to seek reconsideration of the orders of the Commission for which they seek 
review and because Petitioners failed to preserve any standing they otherwise may have 
had. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-7-15; 63-46b-12; 63-46b-16, Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 
2001 UT 81, ffi[ 29-30, 31 P.3d 1147 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: Does the Court have jurisdiction to consider this appeal given that 
Petitioners lacked standing to seek rehearing or reconsideration of the orders under 
review in these consolidated appeals. Further, should Roger Ball's and Claire Geddes' 
appeal of order denying them intervention be dismissed because they did not adequately 
seek rehearing or reconsideration and have not briefed the issue? The issues raised are 
questions of law, but also involve questions of fact relating to Petitioners' alleged status 
as Questar Corporation shareholders and their actions in demonstrating and preserving 
any standing they may otherwise have had. The questions regarding Petitioners' 
standing were preserved for appeal by the Response of Questar Gas Company in 
Opposition to Requests for Reconsideration of Report and Order and Request for 
Reconsideration of Order on Request to Intervene. See R. 1156. 
2
 Questar Corporation is the parent and sole shareholder of Questar Gas. The 
common stock of Questar Corporation is publicly-traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
3
 See, e.g., Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, f^ 12, 73 P.3d 334; S & G, 
Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1990); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Commn, 624 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Utah 1981). 
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Issue 2: Did the Commission's conclusion in a 1999 general rate case found in 
the 2004 Order4 and the Clarification Order5 that Questar Gas had not met its burden to 
demonstrate that costs associated with processing coal-bed methane were prudently 
incurred for the period June 1999 through May 2004 bar the Commission from 
considering the prudence of costs incurred prospectively starting in 2005 in a new and 
separate docket, and, if so, were Petitioners substantially prejudiced? See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d). For aspects of this issue dealing with the Commission's 
ratemaking function, the issue is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. For 
aspects of this issue dealing with res judicata, this is an issue of law governed by the 
correction of error standard.6 This issue roughly encompasses Petitioners' issues 1 and 2, 
and was not preserved on appeal by Petitioners because no party with standing sought 
rehearing or reconsideration of the final order at issue in this case. However, assuming 
for purposes of argument that Petitioners had standing, Questar Gas accepts Petitioners' 
statement that they raised these issues in their request for rehearing below.7 
4
 Order, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 57-05 (Utah PSC Aug. 
30, 2004) {"2004 Order") at 18. Addendum 9 to Petitioners' Brief. The 2004 Order is 
attached as Addendum 7. 
5
 Order on Request for Reconsideration or Clarification, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 
99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 03-057-05 (Utah PSC Oct. 20, 2004) ("Clarification Order") 
at 3. The Clarification Order is attached as Addendum 8. 
6
 See, e.g., WWC Holding Co. v. Public Serv. Comm % 2002 UT 23, ffif 7-8, 44 
P.3d 714; Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, ffi[ 13-16, 7 P.3d 777; Anderson v. 
Public Serv. Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 1992). 
See Petitioners' Brief ("Br.") 12-15. This statement also applies to Issues 4 and 
5. 
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Issue 3: Was the Commission's finding of prudence and approval of a negotiated 
settlement among all parties to the proceeding below supported by substantial, competent 
evidence, and, if not, were Petitioners substantially prejudiced? See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g). This is a mixed question of fact and law governed by the substantial 
evidence standard. See Elks Lodges No. 719 & No. 2021 v. Dept. of Alcohol. Bev. 
Control Comm '«, 905 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Utah 1995). Petitioners fail to identify 
substantial evidence review as having any bearing on this appeal, instead inappropriately 
asking the Court to apply a correction of error standard to every aspect of review of the 
Commission's order. Likewise, Petitioners fail to make any attempt to marshal the 
evidence in support of the Commission's order. Thus, Petitioners have failed to preserve 
on appeal any factual objections to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the Court should 
o 
assume the sufficiency of that evidence. With respect to claims that the evidence was 
incompetent, Petitioners do not identify this as an issue in their appeal. In any event, the 
issue was not preserved on appeal by Petitioners because no party with standing sought 
rehearing or reconsideration of the final order at issue in this case. However, Questar 
Gas acknowledges that Petitioners made the same argument in their request for rehearing 
below. R. 1145 at 54-60. 
Issue 4; Did the Commission provide due process in conducting its proceedings 
below and in reaching its final determination, and, if not, were Petitioners prejudiced? 
6
 See, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^  19, 100 P.3d 1177; Tanner v. Carter, 
2001 UT 18, If 17, 20 P.3d 332. 
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See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(e). This is an issue of law governed by the 
correction of error standard.9 This issue roughly corresponds to Petitioners' issues. 
Issue 5: Was the Commission authorized to approve a settlement involving an 
affiliate transaction? This issue is governed by the abuse of discretion standard because it 
involves statutory language indicating legislative intent to delegate interpretation to the 
Commission.10 This issue roughly corresponds to Petitioners' issues 3 and 4. 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Statutes that are or may be determinative or of central importance to this appeal 
are as follows, and are attached as Addendum 1: Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4, 54-4-26, 
54-7-1, 54-7-13, 54-7-15, 63-46b-14, and 63-46b-16. 
IV, STATEMENT OF CASE11 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is a review of a final order {""2006 Order"), attached as Addendum 2, 
issued by the Commission on January 6, 2006, approving the terms of the Gas 
Management Cost Stipulation ("Stipulation") entered into among Questar Gas, the 
Division, and the Committee, all of the parties to the proceeding below. The Stipulation 
was entered following extensive examination of the issues surrounding the ongoing 
9
 See, e.g., WWC Holding Co., 2001 UT 23 at ^ 8, 44 P.3d at 718; Anderson, 839 
P.2d at 824. 
10
 Morton Int'l v. Auditing Division, Utah Tax Comm 'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 
(Utah 1991). 
11
 Questar Gas does not accept Petitioners' argumentative and inaccurate statement 
of the case, and therefore provides its own statement. 
12
 Report and Order, Docket No.04-057-04, 04-057-11, 04-057-13, 04-057-09, 
05-057-01 (Utah PSC Jan. 6. 2006). 
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production of natural gas extracted from coal seams ("coal-bed methane") located in the 
Ferron area of Emery County, Utah. This type of natural gas has been produced in 
increasing quantities in recent years by energy producers unaffiliated with Questar Gas, 
and is an increasingly large component of the gas supply purchased by Questar Gas to 
meet the needs of its customers. Although it is a high-quality and (in relative terms) 
inexpensive source of gas, it can cause potential safety concerns because it has a lower 
heat content that is not compatible with the appliance settings of many older appliances 
of Questar Gas customers. 
Throughout the proceeding below, the parties and the Commission examined the 
best method of addressing the existence of coal-bed methane in close proximity to the 
Company's system. J The regulators and Questar Gas concluded that it was best for 
Questar Gas to continue to purchase coal-bed methane and that the coal-bed methane 
should continue to be processed at a plant located in Castle Valley, Utah ("C02 Removal 
Plant"),14 to remove carbon dioxide ("C02") during the remaining three years of an 
expected ten-year transition period. The 10-year transition period was planned in 1998 to 
allow customers a reasonable period of time to replace worn out appliances or to adjust 
existing appliances during routine inspection and maintenance visits ("Green Sticker 
13
 This gas is otherwise usable by nearly all other natural gas consumers in the 
United States and meets the quality standards of the interstate pipeline grid. R. 235 at 11. 
14
 The plant is owned by Questar Transportation Service Company ("Questar 
Transportation'"), a subsidiary of Questar Pipeline Company ("Questar Pipeline"). 
Questar Pipeline is the affiliate of Questar Gas that transports natural gas in interstate 
commerce for delivery to customers, including Questar Gas. Questar Pipeline is 
regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). 
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Program") so that all appliances would operate safely with lower-heat-content gas 
without the incurrence by customers of unnecessary costs.1S 
The dispute now before the Court is whether there is legal and factual support for 
the conclusion reached by the Commission and the parties on a prudent course of action 
for Questar Gas to pursue in addressing the increasing presence of coal-bed methane near 
its system, and on the grant of partial rate recovery for that course of action. According 
to Petitioners, the Commission is precluded from granting cost recovery for any option 
using the C02 Removal Plant even if it is the lowest-cost and most-reliable option 
because the Commission previously denied recovery for the costs of the Plant incurred 
during a different time period under different circumstances. This flies in the face of the 
facts that the Commission specifically ruled that it would institute a proceeding to deal 
with this issue prospectively (2004 Order at 38-39), and that Questar Gas could seek to 
recover C02 removal costs in a future proceeding. Clarification Order at 4-5. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
1. Proceedings Culminating in the Commission's 2004 Order 
Petitioners' Brief is technically correct in noting that there have been a number of 
Commission dockets associated with coal-bed methane in recent years. Br. 16. The 
15
 R. 235 at 9-10. During the transition period, Questar Gas is using C02 removal 
to manage the heat content of its gas supply in the narrow range of overlap between the 
old and new heat-content specification thus ensuring compatibility between the 
Company's gas supplies and its customers' appliance settings, whether set at the old or 
new specification. R. 246 at 37. 
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suggestion that the number of dockets has been confusing, however, is misleading.16 The 
lead Petitioners, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes, have a thorough knowledge of the 
Commission's docketing system, and Mr. Ball was intimately involved in all proceedings 
related to coal-bed methane in his prior employment as director of the Committee's staff. 
There have only been three proceedings in which the question of rate recovery for costs 
incurred in processing coal-bed methane has been substantively addressed. 
First, in late 1998 in Docket No. 98-057-12, Questar Gas requested authorization 
to include C02 removal costs in its 191 Account. The Commission issued a final order in 
December 1999 that C02 removal costs could not be recovered through the 191 Account 
because they were not appropriate pass-through costs under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-
12(3). The Commission stated that such costs could only be recovered by the Company 
17 
through a general or abbreviated rate case. 
In October 2001, this Court reversed the 1999 Order in the 2001 Decision, holding 
that the 191 Account was a separate rate-changing mechanism not tied to the pass-
16
 Br. 88-91. The number of additional dockets is due to the gas cost pass-through 
proceedings the Company files as a matter of course pursuant to its 191 Gas Cost 
Balancing Account ("191 Account" or "pass-through account"). If the Company is to 
receive cost recovery for any gas processing charges, these charges must be included in 
pass-through filings. These proceedings true-up the Company's gas commodity related 
costs two or more times per year. They would proceed regardless of whether or not the 
Company were dealing with coal-bed methane, and their docket numbers have simply 
been consolidated with the docket numbers of the cases addressing coal-bed methane. 
The coal-bed methane processing charges are recovered in these pass-through 
proceedings pursuant to this Court's decision in Questar Gas Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm % 2001 UT 93, 34 P.3d 218 ("2001 Decision"), discussed below. 
17
 Report and Order, Docket No. 98-057-12 (Utah PSC Dec. 3, 1999) ("1999 
Order") at 3. 
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through statute and that the Commission was required to consider the Company's 
application according to previously established 191 Account procedures. 
Second, in December 1999, Questar Gas filed a general rate case in Docket 
No. 99-057-20, seeking, among other things, rate recovery of C02 removal costs in 
response to the 1999 Order. Before the parties put on all evidence or conducted full 
cross examination on this issue, Questar Gas and the Division filed a C02 Stipulation 
agreeing that $5 million (approximately 68 percent) of C02 removal costs could be 
included in rates each year for five years beginning in June 1999. They also agreed that 
if Questar Gas wished recovery of any C02 removal costs after May 2004, it would be 
required to seek further regulatory approval. In August 2000, the Commission issued its 
1 R 
order approving the stipulation. 
The Committee sought review of the 2000 Order by this Court, and, in August 
2003, the Court reversed that order.19 The Court held that the Commission could not 
allow rate recovery of the processing costs solely on the ground that they provided safe 
gas without finding them prudent. 2003 Decision at f 13. 
Based on the fact that Docket No. 99-057-20 had ended in a stipulated settlement 
and the parties had not completed that portion of the presentation of their cases, following 
the Court's 2003 Decision, Questar Gas sought an opportunity to marshal the evidence in 
18
 Report and Order, Docket No. 99-057-20 (Utah PSC Aug. 11, 2000) ("2000 
Order"). (See Br. Addendum 5) 
Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Serv. Comm V?, 2003 UT 29, *[] 16, 75 
P.3d481 ("2003 Decision"). 
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support of a finding of prudence. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion (Br. 40, 59), this did 
not involve the presentation of any new evidence; rather, it involved reviewing the 
evidence already on the record of the 1999 general rate case and making argument as to 
why such evidence supported (or did not support) rate recovery of C02 removal costs for 
the time period covered by that case as provided in the C02 Stipulation. After this Court 
denied an emergency petition by the Committee intended to stop any further Commission 
proceedings,21 the parties marshaled the evidence and presented their arguments to the 
Commission. 2004 Order at 13-14. 
The order resulting from this process was the 2004 Order, exhaustively (and often 
misleadingly) addressed in Petitioners' Brief. The Commission found, based on the 
record as it was developed in the 1998 and 1999 cases, that Questar Gas had not met its 
burden to demonstrate that the C02 removal costs were prudently incurred. See id. at 49. 
As a result, the Commission denied all rate recovery for the C02 removal costs under the 
C02 Stipulation, and Questar Gas returned to customers $29 million (including interest) 
recovered from June 1999 through May 2004 and removed these costs from rates going 
forward. R. 235 at 13. Contrary to Petitioners' suggestion, the Commission never found 
that C02 removal costs were in fact "imprudently" incurred. 
Questar Gas sought reconsideration and clarification of the 2004 Order. The 
Commission issued the Clarification Order on October 20, 2004. In the Clarification 
20
 Order, Docket Nos. 98-057-12, 99-057-20, 01-057-14, and 03-057-05 (Utah 
PSC Dec. 17, 2003) {-2003 Order"). {See Br. Addendum 7). 
Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, Case No. 20040060-
SC, Order Denying Petition for Extraordinary Relief (Utah March 22, 2004). 
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Order, the Commission stated that the 2004 Order did not preclude Questar Gas from 
seeking recovery of C02 removal costs in other dockets. Clarification Order at 5. 
Third, this proceeding, which is a consolidation of five dockets, was initiated 
based on the Commission's direction in the 2004 Order that it would "address, in a 
separate docket, how to craft a long-term solution to the compatibility of customer 
appliances with natural gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the utility's 
obligation to provide safe commodity and service to its customers." 2004 Order at 38-
39. 
2. Proceedings Following the Period Covered by the 2004 Order. 
a. Pass-through dockets and the Commission-ordered investigation 
Pursuant to its standard 191 Account practice, Questar Gas filed pass-through gas 
cost applications on May 5, 2004 in Docket No. 04-057-04, on September 17, 2004 in 
Docket No. 04-057-11, and on December 9, 2004 in Docket No. 04-057-13. R. 1-26, 45-
69, 106-116. The requests for recovery of C02 removal costs in these applications served 
as placeholders for consideration by the Commission of C02 removal costs going 
forward. They are three of the five dockets in which the 2006 Order now on appeal was 
issued. 
The fourth docket, Docket No. 04-057-09, was opened by the Commission 
following the issuance of the 2004 Order to address how to "craft a long-term solution to 
the compatibility of customer appliances with . . . coal-seam gas". 2004 Order at 38-39. 
The Commission issued a notice of scheduling conference on September 8, 2004, "to set 
dates for technical conferences to discuss the long-term solution to Questar Gas 
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Company's gas quality." R. 41. In this Commission-initiated docket, a scheduling order 
established dates and subjects for a series of technical conferences to explore various 
aspects of the ongoing coal-bed methane issue. R. 235 at 16. The technical conferences 
commenced on October 13, 2004 and continued through January 19, 2005.22 
In all, six publicly-noticed technical conferences were held, each lasting many 
hours, and each with vigorous discussion among the participants. R. 1144 at 17-24. The 
topic, as the Commission indicated in its 2004 Order, was what to do about the coal-bed 
methane that was being produced in large and increasing quantities by producers 
unaffiliated with Questar Gas in close proximity to the Company's system. This gas had 
become an important, low-cost component of the Company's gas supplies. Id. at 36. 
Other participants questioned Questar Gas about its proposals for dealing with the heat-
content compatibility issue and customers' current appliance settings, and provided their 
own proposals, input and direction on issues for which they felt further attention was 
warranted. Id. at 35-37. The participants addressed the issues in the context of the 
standards for establishing prudence and addressing potential affiliate conflicts set forth in 
the 2004 Order and the Clarification Order. 
Through the technical conferences, the Company's decision-making process for 
addressing current issues with coal-bed methane was transparent and open for review and 
input by all interested participants, including the Committee and its staff under Mr. Ball's 
22
 R. 235 at 16-17. Participants included the Committee with Mr. Ball as its staff 
director, the Division, the Commission and its staff, consumer representatives, industrial 
customers, various heating and ventilation contractors, several state and local building 
inspectors, and other interested persons. R. 1150 at 7-8. 
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direction, each step of the way throughout the technical conferences. Questar Gas 
actively and repeatedly solicited input by the other participants on how to identify and 
implement the best long-term solution to coal-bed methane. Id. at 37. 
b. Proceedings in consolidated dockets, including Docket No. 05-
057-01 
In light of the conclusions reached in the collaborative technical conferences on 
the most prudent course to follow in handling coal-bed methane, Questar Gas filed a 
verified application in a consolidated docket, including the foregoing dockets and the 
fifth docket in which the 2006 Order was issued, Docket No. 05-057-01, on January 31, 
2005, seeking recovery of its costs incurred for management of gas quality. R. 129-213. 
All further proceedings were captioned under the five consolidated docket numbers. The 
publicly-filed, verified application included a thorough review of the subjects discussed 
and conclusions reached in the six technical conferences and included exhibits consisting 
of essentially every document that had been reviewed in the technical conferences.24 
R. 1144 at 37. Members of the Committee's staff were present for every one of 
the technical conferences and actively participated in the discussion. R. 1144 at 17. 
Mr. Ball, himself, was present for all or most of the technical conferences. He also 
participated in other meetings directly between Questar Gas and Committee staff on these 
issues during this time period. R. 679 at 2-3; R. 680 at 6; R. 681 at 6. He was fully 
aware that the Commission and parties were considering the appropriateness of continued 
C02 removal and attendant rate recovery for that removal (R. 1150 at 7), leaving no 
basis for Petitioners to complain that the purpose of Docket No. 04-057-09 was somehow 
masked from their view or that they had no idea that settlement by the Committee was a 
possibility. Br. 88-91. 
24
 The verified application set forth the Company's decision-making process on 
addressing coal-bed methane in the technical conferences (R. 130-216), contrary to 
Petitioners' representation that information from the technical conferences was not 
available to the public. Br. 52-53, 83 n. 24. Beyond that, the technical conferences were 
publicly-noticed meetings. R. 83, 118-122. 
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The Commission gave notice on February 22, 2005 of a conference to schedule 
further proceedings in the consolidated docket. R. 220. At that conference held on 
March 1, 2005, the parties agreed upon a schedule under which Questar Gas would file 
testimony on April 15 supporting the prudence of its ongoing gas management 
expenditures and the Division, Committee and any intervenor would file responsive 
testimony on August 15. Hearings were scheduled to commence on October 6, 2005. 
R. 230. Mr. Ball was intimately familiar with this contemplated schedule, and from the 
language of the Request to Intervene filed in these dockets on November 17, 2005, it 
appears that Ms. Geddes was also. 
As contemplated by the established schedule, Questar Gas filed testimony of six 
witnesses, consisting of 206 pages of testimony and 45 exhibits, in support of its verified 
application on April 15, 2005. R. 234-307. The Division and Committee retained 
independent consultants and served over 400 discovery requests that ultimately resulted 
in the production of nearly 1,000 pages of studies and information. R. 1144 at 36. An 
R. 336 at 2-3 (Ms. Geddes and Mr. Ball represented that they "are extremely 
experienced and knowledgeable about utility and regulatory issues generally. . . . 
Moreover, they are both very knowledgeable about the specific dockets captioned above 
from a time even before Docket 98-057-T02 [the docket in which the heat-content 
specification in the Questar Gas tariff was lowered]. Ms. Geddes has provided a 
consistent voice for consumers throughout these entire proceedings. Mr. Ball has 
followed the proceedings from Questar's first briefing of Commission, Division and 
Committee staff in 1997 through the Technical Conference held on January 19[, 2005] 
and Questar's January application filing.") 
As discussed in Section VI.D.2, below, this self-proclaimed knowledge and 
involvement is highly relevant because it demonstrates the complete inexcusability of 
Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes' seeking intervention as late as they did. See Intervention 
Order, R. 1150, attached as Addendum 3, at 13-14. Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes are clearly 
the lead Petitioners in this matter. 
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order rescheduling their testimony filing date to September 20, 2005 and the hearing to 
November 1, 2005 was issued September 6, 2005. R. 317. 
On October 11, 2005, after extensive and difficult settlement discussions over the 
course of many months, at which not only the parties but others who expressed an interest 
participated in the matter (including industrial customers and others from the technical 
conferences), the parties filed the Stipulation. R. 322; R. 2297 at 15. On the same day, 
even though no public hearing is required for the approval of a settlement among all 
parties to a case (see Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-l(3)(e)(ii)(C)), the Commission gave notice 
of public hearings on approval of the Stipulation. R. 323. 
The hearings were held on October 20 as scheduled. Each of the parties provided 
a witness in support of approval of the Stipulation. In addition, as provided in the 
Stipulation, the parties moved the Commission to take notice of information provided in 
the technical conferences and the Company's verified application and to admit into 
evidence the sworn testimony of Questar Gas filed on April 15 in support of approval of 
the Stipulation. No one objected. The Commission asked questions regarding the 
motion and the Stipulation, which were answered by the witnesses. R. 2297. Two 
people appeared and offered sworn testimony at the public witness hearing scheduled at 
4:30 p.m. on the same day. Their presence demonstrated that the Commission's notice 
The information provided in the technical conferences was largely incorporated 
into the verified application filed January 31, 2005 (R. 130) and the sworn testimony of 
Barrie L. McKay and Lawrence Conti filed April 15, 2005 (R. 235-82), essentially 
rendering moot the issue of whether taking administrative notice of the technical 
conferences was necessary. See R. 1144 at 32 n. 18. 
- 1 4 -
was effective as to the public generally. At the conclusion of the public witness hearing, 
the Commission took the matter under advisement. R. 2299 at 16. 
A number of days after the conclusion of proceedings, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes 
contacted the Commission, complaining that they were not aware of the hearing and 
requesting the opportunity to file statements. R. 1150 at 6-7. The Commission told them 
it would accept and consider their late statements. They filed affidavits on November 4, 
2005. R. 328-30. Questar Gas filed a response on November 11. R. 335. 
On November 17, 2005, four weeks after the proceeding was concluded, Mr. Ball 
and Ms. Geddes filed a Request to Intervene, containing essentially the same information 
and argument that was included in their affidavits. R. 336. The only excuse they offered 
for not intervening sooner was that they were not aware of the Stipulation and hearing on 
it, but they acknowledged they were well aware of the proceeding and its general 
schedule. R. 1150 at 6-7. In support of the Request to Intervene, Mr. Ball and 
Ms. Geddes prepared and filed form statements of support signed by a number of 
individuals or couples claiming to be customers of Questar Gas, among whom were most 
of the other 53 Petitioners.27 Questar Gas, the Division and the Committee all filed 
responses in opposition to the Request to Intervene. R. 679-81. Mr. Ball and 
Ms. Geddes filed a reply to the oppositions. R. 685. 
On January 6, 2006, the Commission issued the Intervention Order, denying the 
request of Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes to intervene. R. 1150. On the same day, the 
27
 R. 337-678. A copy of two of these form statements are attached as Addendum 
4. 
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Commission issued the 2006 Order approving the Stipulation. R. 1144. Mr. Ball and 
Ms. Geddes (joined by the 53 other Petitioners) sought reconsideration of the 2006 Order 
on February 6, 2006. R. 1156-59. On that same day, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes also 
separately sought reconsideration of the Intervention Order. R. 1162-63. On February 
21, 2006, Questar Gas, the Division, and the Committee each filed a response in 
opposition to the petitions for reconsideration. R. 2151-53. The Commission did not act 
on the petitions, so they were deemed denied on February 27, 2006. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-15(2)(c). Petitioners filed their petitions for review in this Court on March 27, 
2006. Questar filed motions to dismiss the petitions on May 2, 2006. Petitioners 
responded on May 26, 2006. The Court issued an order on June 5, 2006, deferring the 
motions until it considers the matter on full briefing and oral argument. 
C. Disposition Below 
In the 2006 Order, after carefully reviewing the proceedings, considering the 
effect of the 2004 Order, and reviewing the evidence, the Commission specifically 
concluded that "Questar Gas's use of the C02 Removal Plant from and after February 1, 
2005 to manage the heat content of its gas supplies is prudent and that the partial 
recovery of costs provided in the Stipulation is reasonable and in the public interest." 
R. 1144 at 38. Based on this conclusion, the Commission approved and adopted the 
Stipulation allowing partial recovery of C02 removal costs for a period of three years. 
In the Intervention Order, the Commission concluded that granting intervention to 
Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes after the case had closed would impair the interest of justice 
and the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceeding {see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
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9(2)(b)) and that they had offered no reasonable excuse for their tardy intervention. 
R. 1150 at 6. In addition, the Commission found that their statements were unpersuasive. 
Id. 
D. Statement of Facts 
1. Introduction 
The statement of facts section in Petitioners' Brief rarely cites the record (and the 
few times it does are only for procedural background) and is an argumentative and 
misleading attempt to draw the Court's focus onto questions surrounding the Company's 
handling of coal-bed methane at and before the time of the decision to build the C02 
Removal Plant in 1998. Petitioners attempt to misuse the Commission's unanswered 
questions from the 2004 Order to cast Questar Gas in a negative light and distract from 
the real issue in the case. 
In order to provide a broader context for the Court as it reviews the 2006 Order, 
Questar Gas will provide a brief history of coal-bed methane in Utah, and how this gas 
fits into the natural gas supplies of the Company, of the region, and of the country at 
large. This broader context demonstrates the soundness of the Commission's decision in 
this case, by appropriately casting the issue as one of prudence in obtaining and 
managing gas supplies for the benefit of customers today. 
The misleading nature of Petitioners' statement of facts is demonstrated by 
comparing it with Sections I, III and V.B of the 2006 Order, R. 1144 at 1-4, 8-26, 33-38. 
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2. Background of Natural Gas Use, Production and Regulation 
"Natural gas" is the general term used to describe a variety of hydrocarbon 
molecules extracted from underground formations that include primarily methane, and, in 
some cases, smaller quantities of ethane, butane and propane. Various trace elements and 
impurities are found in natural gas. Some of these, such as hydrogen sulfide, can be 
deadly or cause corrosion or other equipment problems. R. 279 at 13. Natural gas is 
mixed with air and burned to produce heat or electricity. R. 246 at 7. In order for 
combustion to occur safely and efficiently, a correct ratio of air and natural gas is 
required. Id. If the correct ratio is not provided, problems such as "incomplete 
combustion" or "flame liftoff might result, causing the production of carbon monoxide 
or the flame to extinguish, either of which can result in injury or death. R. at 12; R. 304 
at 10. Different types of natural gas produced in different fields have different heating 
values and specific gravities, which together are important components of what is 
referred to herein as the "heat content" of natural gas. R. 246 at 18. In order for an 
appliance to operate properly, the orifice of the appliance and air mixture must be 
adjusted or sized based on the altitude at which the appliance is located and the expected 
heat content of the gas that will fuel the appliance.29 
Given the need to manage the heat content of the gas so that it is compatible with 
customer appliances, to address gas that has excessive or insufficient heavier 
hydrocarbons such as propane and butane, to address trace elements, and to deal with 
Id. at 8. An appliance orifice limits the flow of natural gas into an appliance's 
combustion chamber through a fixed or adjustable opening. R. 246 at 7-8. 
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inert gases such as C02 and nitrogen, almost all gas must be "processed" in one way or 
another before it can safely be burned by end-users. R. 246 at 20-22. Such processing is 
routinely considered a part of the costs a prudent utility must incur to provide safe, 
useable gas for its customers. Id. at 69. 
Historically, Questar Gas operated as somewhat of an island with regard to its gas 
supplies, and the heat content of the gas delivered to its Utah customers was higher than 
that in gas produced in other parts of the country. R. 235 at 11. This was a result of the 
nature of the natural gas supply that was prevalent in the Intermountain West from the 
1920s to the mid-1990s. Appliance orifices were set accordingly. As required by its 
tariff and Commission rule, Questar Gas managed the gas supplies reaching its 
customers so as to be within the prescribed heat-content range and to ensure 
compatibility with their appliances. R. 246 at 20. Thus, while coal-bed methane could 
have been used in large quantities in every other area of the country without causing a 
heat-content compatibility problem, such was not the case in the Company's Utah service 
territory. Id. at 34. 
Beginning in 1985, FERC began a course of regulatory changes under the Natural 
Gas Act that ultimately resulted in a competitive interstate pipeline grid and nationwide 
market/1 As a result of these FERC actions, Questar Pipeline became a common carrier 
with no ability to discriminate in favor of Questar Gas or its customers. This common 
30
 See Utah Admin. Code R746-320-2.B; R. 246 at 10-11, 13. 
31
 R. 246 at 22; R. 297 at 9. See also Order No. 436, 1982-85 FERC Stats. & 
Regs., Regs. Preambles ^ 30,665 (1985); Order No. 636, 1991-96 FERC Stats. & Regs., 
Regs. Preambles, ^ 30,939 (1992). 
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carrier status forced the Company's gas supplies to be mixed with increasing quantities of 
other pipeline customers' natural gas streams as Questar Pipeline, in addition to carrying 
the Company's supplies, was required to expand its transportation of gas for others. If 
gas supplies met FERC-approved tariff standards, as coal-bed methane did, Questar 
Pipeline could not refuse to transport them. R. 246 at 22, 39. In addition, other pipelines 
began to build facilities to carry gas into and out of the Rocky Mountain region. Id. at 
17. Thus, the heat content of natural gas transported on Questar Pipeline and delivered to 
Questar Gas began to change as Questar Pipeline was forced by FERC to integrate into 
the national pipeline grid. Id. at 23. 
3, Background of Coal-Bed Methane from the Ferron Area 
In the 1990s, the heat content of the Company's gas supplies generally was 
declining. Id. at 14. The introduction onto the Company's system of coal-bed methane 
from the Ferron area (near Price, Utah) was one of the factors leading to that decline. 
Coal-bed methane is nearly pure methane, and has a lower heat content than other gases 
containing more ethane, butane or propane. Id. at 18; R. 279 at 13. It was introduced 
onto Questar Pipeline's system in the early 1990s after Questar Pipeline built facilities 
extending its pipeline and allowing the gas to be transported on the interstate grid. R. 246 
at 12. Questar Gas was the only Questar Pipeline customer with heat-content standards 
that were inconsistent with the heat-content of the coal-bed methane as delivered to the 
pipeline. Id. at 24, 34. Although the coal-bed methane was originally being purchased 
Id. at 31. Another significant factor in the declining heat content was the 
removal of ethane, butane and propane by producers from the natural gas stream when 
market conditions justified the removal. Id. at 25-26. 
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by parties other than Questar Gas, it was being delivered to Questar Gas because the coal-
bed methane was the closest source of gas to the Questar Gas delivery points at Payson 
and Indianola in Utah County. 
For several years, the volumes of coal-bed methane being delivered to Questar 
Gas were insignificant and could easily be blended with other sources of gas without 
having a significant impact on the heat content of the overall supply. Id. at 12. However, 
as the production of coal-bed methane increased more substantially and rapidly than 
projected (id; R. 279 at 28-30), it became apparent in 1997 that the heat content of the 
coal-bed methane would begin to affect the overall heat content of the supplies being 
delivered to Questar Gas at its points of delivery in Payson and Indianola by summer 
1999. R. 246 at 40-43. Questar Gas realized that there would be a critical compatibility 
problem between its customers' appliances and the gas supplies those appliances would 
be receiving. Id. at 34. This problem and the continuing decline in heat content of other 
sources of gas led the Company to seek a tariff change to lower the heat content approved 
for its gas supplies in April 1998. R. 235 at 8; R. 246 at 35. The evidence presented in 
Docket No. 98-057-12 indicated that it would take at least four years for customers to 
adjust their appliances on an expedited basis and that the expense of this expedited 
R. 246 at 31. The physics of the pipeline system are such that, for example, a 
customer in Wyoming "purchasing" gas supplies from a producer in Utah does not 
necessarily get the physical molecules produced in Utah. Rather, the purchaser buys a 
certain volume of gas, but obtains whatever molecules happen to be in the pipeline at the 
point of delivery to the purchaser, while some other purchaser will receive the physical 
molecules produced in Utah. Id. at 50-54. 
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program would be more than $100 million. Therefore, Questar Gas proposed to 
provide customers a reasonable period of time, estimated at 10 years, to replace 
appliances or to have their appliance inspected and, if necessary, adjusted in the normal 
course. R. 235 at 9-10. About this same time, the Company determined that the removal 
of C02 from coal-bed methane provided gas that was compatible with the range of 
overlap between the new lower-heat-content and the old higher-heat-content 
specifications. R. 235 at 11; R. 246 at 42-43. Accordingly, Questar Gas entered into a 
contract with Questar Transportation to build and operate the C02 Removal Plant. R. 235 
at 11-12. The contract assured that the C02 removal costs would be no greater than if 
Questar Gas owned and operated the plant itself. Id, at 27. 
Much of the Commission's cause for questioning the Company's prudence in the 
2004 Order resulted from the fact that the coal-bed methane had been introduced initially 
onto the Company's system by virtue of Questar Pipeline transporting it rather than being 
purchased or necessary for the Company's customers. R. 1144 at 33. In addition, the 
Commission wondered if the Company might have identified the heat-content 
compatibility problem and potential solutions sooner absent affiliate involvement. Id. 
However, while Petitioners cite the 2004 Order for all manner of "findings" about 
34
 2004 Order at 5, 18; R. 130 at 5 fn 1; R. 235 at 9. See also Prepared Testimony 
of Alan K. Allred, Docket No. 98-057-12 (Feb. 1, 1999) at 6-7 (-[Questar Gas] attempted 
to develop an estimate of the cost and time required to have approximately 620,000 Utah 
customers have their appliances adjusted to the new setpoint.. . . This resulted in a total 
cost of about $111 million. Discussions with HVAC contractors revealed that they did 
not see any way to accomplish this work in 1-2 years. They thought that even 4-5 years 
was too optimistic. Both [Questar Gas] and HVAC contractors were concerned with the 
cost, disruption, confusion and inconvenience customers would experience with a rapid 
re-orificing solution."). 
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imprudence, the 2004 Order was merely a determination by the Commission that the 
Company had failed to meet its burden of proof of demonstrating, through 
contemporaneous documentation, that costs of C02 removal should be included in rates. 
As the Commission said: 
Due to our conclusion that Questar failed to establish an adequate 
evidentiary basis upon which we could conclude that its decision to 
enter into the processing contract and incur the costs it agreed to 
were prudent and not unduly influenced by its affiliate relationships, 
we see no avenue for recovery, based on this record, while 
remaining compliant with the Supreme Court's decision. 
Clarification Order at 6. The Commission did not find that the Company was imprudent. 
And nothing in the 2004 Order precluded the Company from seeking to meet its burden 
of showing that C02 removal was prudent in the future, particularly based on different 
facts and circumstances. To the contrary, the Commission stated that *'our [2004 Order] 
does not preclude Questar from seeking recovery of C02 processing costs in other 
dockets." Id. at 4-5. 
4. Coal-Bed Methane Considered in Light of What Is Known Today 
The undisputed testimony in the current case has shown that the facts and 
circumstances with regard to coal-bed methane have changed. The fact is that coal-bed 
methane is being discovered and produced throughout the Rocky Mountain region and 
nation (again, Questar Gas and its affiliates are not the producers) and is becoming an 
increasingly important source of natural gas supply as other sources dwindle. R. 246 at 
17, 26; 279 at 23-24. In Utah, coal-bed methane accounted for 31 percent of total natural 
gas production in 2004 (id. at 19), and 10 percent of the national supply. Id. at 15. Thus, 
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given the proximity of major supplies of this gas close to the Company's system, the 
nature of the interstate pipeline grid, and the generally increasing prevalence of this lower 
heat-content gas source regionally and throughout the nation, it was inevitable that the 
heat content of the Company's gas supplies would be lower, regardless of whether or not 
Questar Pipeline had built facilities in the 1990s to transport the Ferron-area gas. R. 246 
at 25-26; R. 279 at 18-20. 
The undisputed evidence likewise demonstrated that the changes in gas supplies 
were beyond both the Company's and its affiliates' control. R. 246 at 31-32; R. 279 at 
22-26; R. 297 at 8-11. It demonstrated that as a result of large proven reserves in the 
area, coal-bed methane would likely provide a significant portion of the gas Questar Gas 
receives in the future from both Kern River Pipeline and Questar Pipeline (R. 279 at 22-
23), and that without those reserves the price Questar Gas pays for natural gas would 
increase significantly. R. 283 at 11-15; R. 297 at 22. It also demonstrated that all coal-
bed methane shares the characteristic of lower heat-content due to the fact that its 
hydrocarbons are nearly pure methane and that it contains CO2, and that it would be 
imprudent for Questar Gas not to plan to accept increased quantities of coal-bed methane 
in the future. R. 279 at 22. 
Further, the undisputed evidence showed both that the Company and its affiliates 
could not in fact have predicted the huge increase in production of coal-bed methane in 
the 1990s sooner than they did {id. at 29-30), and that in any event the development of 
large quantities of coal-bed methane geographically near the Company's system has 
reduced the market price of all gas supplies purchased by the Company (R. 283 at 29-30; 
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R. 297 at 21-23), saving the Company's customers approximately $30 million in 
purchased gas costs from October 1998 through December 2004 and $12 million from 
January 2003 through December 2004 alone. R. 283 at 28-29. The evidence further 
demonstrated that the availability of coal-bed methane and the construction of Mainline 
104 (which resulted from the development of coal-bed methane),35 allowed Questar Gas 
to realize additional savings of approximately $3 million per year. The evidence 
showed that all of the identified cost savings would continue in the future. Id. at 28-29. 
The evidence showed that because Questar Gas had not sought a change in Questar 
Pipeline's tariff specifications to keep coal-bed methane off the pipeline or to require 
producers to pay for C02 removal, Questar Gas had avoided costs of processing its 
Company-owned gas to meet the more stringent standards of from $8 million to $18 
million per year. Id. at 25, 29; R. 292. The evidence shows the benefits of utilizing coal-
bed methane result in lower costs to the Company's customers far exceeding the $4 
million per year of C02 removal costs provided in the Stipulation. 
5. Analysis of Gas Management Alternatives 
The undisputed evidence explained the safety risks to customers from the 
introduction of currently purchased quantities of coal-bed methane into the Company's 
35
 Mainline 104 is a pipeline constructed by Questar Pipeline in 2001 to transport 
natural gas from the Ferron area to an interconnection with Kern River Pipeline near 
Goshen, Utah. R. 246 at 44. 
36
 R. 283 at 15-20. The $3 million savings is composed of released capacity 
savings in Mainline 104 and segmentation savings made possible by Mainline 104. Id. 
In addition, C02 removal is less expensive than other common types of 
processing that must be done with non-coal-bed-methane gas to deal with gas with 
excessive heavy hydrocarbons or to remove hydrogen sulfide. R. 279 at 14. 
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system while many customers still have appliances set to the earlier, higher-heat-content 
specifications. R. 246 at 13-14; R. 304 at 14-15. The evidence demonstrated that the 
Commission's 2004 Order was the guide for the Company's decision-making process in 
dealing with this issue. R. 235 at 20-22. The evidence also demonstrated that Questar 
Gas, with input from the Division and Committee, initially identified and analyzed 14 
alternatives for addressing the prospective heat-content issue. Some of the alternatives 
considered included petitioning FERC for a change in Questar Pipeline's gas quality 
specifications; precision or gross blending; various pipeline projects; propane injection; 
and gas shut in. R. 246 at 55-69. Using the Commission's guidelines on how to 
document prudence from the 2004 Order, the parties determined which alternatives were 
preferable. R. 235 at 20-22; R. 246 at 56. Continued C02 removal and precision 
blending of gas streams on Questar Pipeline's southern system with C02 removal as a 
backup during seven months of the year were identified by all participants as the 
alternatives most worthy of additional consideration. R. 235 24-25; R. 246 at 63-69. The 
costs of the two alternatives were essentially identical over the short term. R. 235 at 24. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrated that the options of shutting in coal-bed 
methane or going to FERC to prevent coal-bed methane from coming into the Company's 
system were neither viable nor desirable. R. 235 at 30; R. 246 at 58-60; R. 279 at 4, 12; 
R. 283 at 24-25. Further, notwithstanding the fact that Questar Gas volunteered to pursue 
a FERC proceeding if requested, no party, including the Committee, desired that Questar 
Gas go to FERC after the issue was thoroughly explored in the technical conferences. R. 
235 at 26; R. 246 at 58-59. In addition to the low likelihood of success based on FERC 
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precedent, going to FERC was inadvisable because low-cost, Company-owned gas could 
be negatively affected by a "favorable" outcome. R. 246 at 58; R. 283 at 24. In other 
words, if the Company succeeded in tightening the standards regarding the gas allowed 
on the Questar Pipeline system, those new standards might easily be used against Questar 
Gas to either keep Company-owned gas that it currently ships on Questar Pipeline off the 
system or to require that it be further processed by Questar Gas before shipping because, 
at times, of its excessively high heavier hydrocarbons. R. 246 at 58; R. 283 at 24. As 
noted previously this avoided costs of $8 million to $18 million per year. R. 283 at 25, 
29; R. 292. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrated that the potential affiliate conflict in 
having Questar Transportation own and operate the C02 Removal Plant had been 
addressed by requiring that the costs incurred by Questar Gas under any contract with 
Questar Transportation be no higher than if Questar Gas owned and operated the plant 
itself and that they be lower than if the plant were owned and operated by a third party. 
R. 235 at 27. 
6. Stipulation 
During the hearing on approval of the Stipulation, testimony was presented by 
Barrie McKay for Questar Gas, William Powell, Ph.D. for the Division, and Dan Gimble, 
for the Committee. Mr. McKay testified that Questar Gas had responded to over 400 
discovery requests from the Division and the Committee and that the responses consisted 
of nearly 1,000 pages of studies, analyses and information on the issues related to gas 
processing, the alternatives and affiliate issues. R. 2297 at 13. He testified that the 
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negotiations that led to the Stipulation were vigorous, intense and difficult and involved 
the outside experts retained by the Division and Committee, as well as the Division and 
Committee staffs. Id, at 15. Mr. McKay testified that the two alternatives identified in 
the technical conferences as being the preferred alternatives, precision blending with C02 
removal as a backup and year-round operation of the C02 Removal Plant, had essentially 
identical costs over the anticipated transition period. Id, at 54. Based on additional 
analysis and information received from third parties following the technical conferences 
and filing of testimony, however, Questar Gas determined that with physical adjustments 
to the C02 Removal Plant and operational cooperation from third parties, the C02 
Removal Plant could provide processing to third parties on an increased basis. Id. at 16, 
55. This increased processing for third parties resulted in the possibility of lower 
processing costs to the Company's customers. Id, Operating the plant year round and 
providing processing services to third parties, accordingly, became the preferred 
alternative because of potential benefits to Questar Gas customers stemming from 
revenue sharing and cost savings. Id. 
Dr. Powell testified that the Division conducted and documented its own analysis 
of the alternatives addressed by Questar Gas and other alternatives, and engaged an 
independent consultant to assist in that evaluation. Id, at 29-30. The Division concluded 
that operation of the C02 Removal Plant during the transition period was a reasonable 
way to meet the defined objectives. Id, at 30. 
Mr. Gimble testified that the Committee staff and its retained expert participated 
in the negotiation of the Stipulation and that the Committee itself had three meetings at 
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which it deliberated on the Stipulation. Id. at 29-30, 41. The Committee's expert 
reached the conclusion that the presence of coal-bed methane on the Company's system 
TO 
presented an increased safety risk for customers. Mr. Gimble further testified that 
circumstances had changed from the prior dockets in which the Committee opposed 
recovery of C02 removal costs. R. 2297 at 35-36, 62. The Committee's prior view that 
the gas had been introduced for the benefit of Questar Pipeline with little corresponding 
benefit to the Company's customers was no longer applicable because coal-bed methane 
is now a significant and beneficial source of the supply purchased by Questar Gas for its 
customers. Id. at 30-32, 36. The Committee concluded that the Company had provided 
compelling evidence that C02 removal was the most effective remedy for dealing with 
the safety risk until customer appliances are transitioned to be compatible with the new 
lower-heat-content range. Id. at 36. 
In response to questions from the Commission, the witnesses confirmed that all 
parties agreed that the alternative of going to FERC to address the issue was not 
desirable. Id. at 44. In response to additional questions, the witnesses explained the 
benefits anticipated from third-party processing and that revenue from third-party 
processing was a potential benefit that made this alternative preferred over precision 
blending with C02 removal as a backup. Id. at 54-57. Dr. Powell and Mr. Gimble 
further testified that the rate recovery provided in the Stipulation was within the range of 
j8
 Id. at 33-34. In connection with the efforts by Mr. Ball to intervene, the 
Committee disclosed that one of the reasons for its earlier position was that Mr. Ball had 
been unwilling to allow the Committee to obtain outside expert assistance on coal-bed 
methane and processing issues. R. 681 at 5. 
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recovery those parties would have recommended had the matter gone to hearing. Id. at 
65. Mr. McKay noted that the estimated costs of C02 removal would increase a typical 
customer's bill by approximately 50 cents per month. Id. at 66. This increase does not 
take into account the benefits in lower gas costs of coal-bed methane. 
All witnesses agreed that customers were not being asked to pay twice to deal with 
the changing heat content of gas on the Company's system, once through appliance 
adjustments and once through increased rates for C02 removal. Customers should have 
their appliances replaced or inspected and adjusted periodically anyway, so they would 
incur those costs regardless of the changing heat-content. Id. at 70. They also noted that 
customers had received a benefit of lower-cost gas through the development of coal-bed 
methane near the Company's distribution area that much more than offset the cost of C02 
removal. Id. at 14, 30, 63, 69. 
7. Commission Findings 
The cumulative weight of the verified application and the sworn written and live 
testimony was overwhelming in this case, and the Commission reasonably relied on 
substantial evidence to support the finding in the 2006 Order that the Company acted 
prudently. R. 1144 at 38. Based on substantial evidence, the Commission found, among 
other things, that: 
• "The record in these dockets . . . indicates that the Company's customers have 
benefitted from the shipment of coal bed methane by Questar Pipeline and that 
coal bed methane has become an important component of Questar Gas's gas 
supplies. Since 2002, coal bed methane has accounted for a significant portion (up 
to 40 percent) of the Company's annual gas supply purchases, compared to less 
than 5 percent only a few years earlier." Id. at 34. 
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• 'This increasing presence of coal bed methane on the Questar Pipeline system 
results from the expansion of the interstate natural gas pipeline grid to transport 
new coal bed methane from wells throughout the Rocky Mountain region. As this 
expansion continues, it is very likely that additional coal bed methane will enter 
Questar Pipeline's system, and thus Questar Gas's system." Id. 
• "[H]aving the C02 Removal Plant owned and operated by Questar Transportation 
does not result in any prejudice to Questar Gas or its customers. The costs 
incurred by Questar Gas are the same as if the plant were owned and operated by 
Questar Gas." Id. 
• "The provisions in the Stipulation that permit recovery of only 90% of non-fuel 
costs, limit fuel costs to 360,000 Dth/year, require the sharing of third-party 
processing revenues in excess of $400,000 per year, and prohibit recovery of costs 
for additional C02 Removal [P]lant facilities assure that the interests of Questar 
Gas's customers are given priority in this arrangement." Id. at 34-35. 
• "[N]o party believes it would be reasonable to pursue actions at the FERC to 
attempt to keep coal bed methane off of Questar Pipeline. Indeed, it appears that 
pursuing such actions would be detrimental to Questar Gas customers." Id. at 35. 
• "The extensive analysis represented by these technical conferences and discovery 
activities resulted in comprehensive and detailed oral and written testimony by 
Company, Division, and Committee witnesses. Key within this testimony are the 
Parties' conclusions that Utah customers have benefitted financially from the 
presence of coal bed methane on the Questar Gas system, that approaching FERC 
to attempt to preclude coal bed methane from the Questar Gas system would not 
be a viable alternative, and that the affiliate interests which so concerned us in 
prior dockets have been subordinated to the interests of Questar Gas customers." 
Id. at 36-37. 
• "Throughout the technical conference process, Questar Gas repeatedly sought 
input from other parties on how to best address the issues presented by the 
presence of coal bed methane going forward. No participant challenged the 
conclusions Questar Gas presented as being prudent and in the best interest of 
customers, and no participant suggested any alternative as more preferable." Id. at 
37. 
• "Questar Gas clearly identified its objective to address the safety issue posed by 
the presence of coal bed methane on its system. The Company identified 
alternatives to meet this objective, employed reasonable methods and criteria in 
evaluating the alternatives, and adequately recorded and documented its 
evaluation. The Company carefully considered potential conflicts between 
affiliates and placed the interests of its customers before those of its affiliates. 
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This process satisfies the concerns outlined in our 2004 Order. We therefore 
conclude that a reasonable, unaffiliated utility, knowing what Questar Gas 
knew or reasonably should have known, could reasonably have acted the way 
Questar Gas has acted in choosing to use the CO2 Removal Plant since 
February 2005 and thereafter." Id. at 37-38. (emphasis added). 
• ''Providing a transition period for customers to have their appliances inspected 
and, if necessary, adjusted to the range now specified in Questar Gas's tariff is 
reasonable both because of the uncontested safety concerns and because customers 
need additional time to complete necessary inspections and adjustments." Id. at 
38. 
• "Given the extensive investigation and analysis undertaken by Questar Gas, the 
Division and the Committee to identify and compare alternatives for dealing with 
this risk, we find that operation of the C02 Removal Plant in accordance with the 
terms of the Stipulation provides a reasonable, reliable, cost-effective solution 
during the necessary transition period." Id. 
• "Based on the findings of fact in the foregoing sections of this Order, we conclude 
that Questar Gas's use of the CO2 Removal Plant from and after February 1, 2005 
to manage the heat content of its gas supplies is prudent and that the partial 
recovery of costs provided in the Stipulation is reasonable and in the public 
interest." Id. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners lacked standing to seek rehearing or reconsideration of the 
Commission's 2006 Order because they were not parties to the case or persons 
pecuniarly interested in Questar Gas. Seeking rehearing or reconsideration is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. In addition, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes have 
abandoned their appeal of the Intervention Order. Therefore, the appeals should be 
dismissed. 
Petitioners' res judicata arguments are fundamentally flawed. This Court has 
repeatedly held that res judicata does not apply to the Commission's legislative 
ratemaking function for good reason: facts and circumstances and even the public 
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interest may change over time. The appropriate issue for the Commission to consider in 
this case was what a prudent utility should do today about the presence of coal-bed 
methane gas in close proximity to its system—should it purchase that gas or attempt to 
keep it off its system? And if it should purchase the gas, what should it do to ensure 
compatibility between the gas supply and customers' appliances, to ensure customer 
safety? These are the issues that the Commission and parties appropriately focused on. 
Petitioners, on the other hand, would have the Commission reject the very option 
that a thorough review has shown is in the best interests of customers. They would have 
the Commission get sidetracked by an erroneous view of res judicata and focus on the 
fact that Questar Gas did not meet its burden of demonstrating the prudence of its 
response to coal-bed methane when the C02 Removal Plant was built, rather than focus 
on whether Questar Gas can demonstrate the prudence of its response to coal-bed 
methane today. In reality, they want Questar Gas to continue to purchase coal-bed 
methane and to continue to pay for C02 removal, but they do not want any part of the 
cost of C02 removal included in rates. 
Petitioners' view of res judicata is simply wrong. The Commission did not 
preclusively determine in the 2004 Order that Questar Gas was imprudent in incurring 
C02 removal costs even in the 1990s. More to the point, the Commission did not 
preclusively determine in the 2004 Order that no costs associated with C02 removal 
could ever be recovered. The Commission clearly stated that it was not making such a 
determination in the Clarification Order. The Commission has not made any 
determination in this case that is inconsistent with the 2004 Order. Nor is Questar Gas 
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seeking to recover the same C02 removal costs it sought in the 1999 rate case—the 
$29 million denied in the 2004 Order has been refunded to customers and Questar Gas 
does not seek to get it back. The prudence of the Company's response to coal-bed 
methane in this case falls squarely within the type of ratemaking decisions that are 
incompatible with the doctrine of res judicata—it involves different costs, different facts, 
and different issues, from different time periods, and is part of the Commission's 
legislative function of determining just and reasonable rates with which the Court does 
not interfere unless the Commission's decision is not supported by substantial, competent 
evidence. Petitioners' argument on inconsistency misses the point. 
Petitioners' evidentiary claims lack merit. They have failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the 2006 Order and thereby have failed to preserve any factual 
objection to the sufficiency of the evidence. The Commission relied on overwhelming, 
competent evidence in finding that the Company's continued purchase and processing of 
coal-bed methane was prudent. Petitioners have not supported nor could they support 
their superficial claim that all of the evidence in the record was incompetent. In any 
event, objections to admission of evidence on competence grounds are waived if not 
made at the time the evidence is offered. 
Petitioners procedural claims lack merit. The Commission provided fair and 
appropriate notice of all proceedings in this case, and it was perfectly appropriate for 
Chairman Campbell to participate. The lead Petitioners had actual notice of the issues 
being addressed and of Chairman Campbell's participation for months, and yet chose not 
to intervene. Petitioners should not be heard to raise procedural objections after the fact, 
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when the case was concluded before they sought to participate. Late-arriving parties 
must take the case as they find it. 
Petitioners * arguments that affiliate transactions are absolutely barred by section 
54-4-26 of the Utah Code or that the 1994 Planning Guidelines require submission and 
approval of the contract with Questar Transportation are incorrect. This Court has 
regularly held that affiliate transactions are subject to higher scrutiny, so, obviously, they 
are not barred. The 1994 Planning Guidelines have no application to this case. In any 
event, the Commission carefully reviewed potential affiliate conflicts and found based on 
substantial evidence that Questar Gas had put the interests of its customers first. Questar 
Gas was not required to submit its contract with Questar Transportation for prior 
approval, and the absence of the contract from the record is irrelevant because the 
Commission has prescribed the terms of rate recovery that will be permitted. The 
Commission complied with all requirements for approval of settlements. 
Petitioners other arguments are irrelevant and unpersuasive. Although the 
Commission did not rely on the technical conferences in reaching its conclusions, they 
are appropriate vehicles for investigation and analysis. Petitioners' argument that the 
2006 Order relies on a cheap gas exception reveals Petitioners' lack of understanding of 
prudence and the inequitable and overreaching nature of their position. 
The 2006 Order in this case is based on substantial evidence, a sound and 
thorough process and reasoned decision-making. Petitioners' attempt to obscure that fact 
by painting a misleading, negative picture about Questar Gas based on a timeframe that is 
irrelevant to this appeal should be rejected. The Court should dismiss their appeal for 
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lack of jurisdiction or affirm the Commission's 2006 Order. Petitioners' request for 
attorneys fees should be denied. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Consider These Appeals Because Petitioners 
Lacked Standing to Seek Reconsideration of the Orders or Have Failed to 
Preserve any Standing They May Have Had. 
Questar Gas has already briefed the jurisdiction and standing issue in memoranda 
in support of its motions to dismiss Petitioners' appeals. Rather than repeating those 
arguments, Questar Gas attaches its memoranda in support of its motions to dismiss as 
Addenda 5 and 6, and adopts them herein by reference. For the reasons set forth in the 
memorandum in Case No. 20060279-SC (Addendum 5) all of the Petitioners lacked 
standing to seek reconsideration of the 2006 Order because they were not parties to the 
proceeding below, having not sought intervention at all, or, in the case of Mr. Ball and 
Ms. Geddes, did not seek intervention until all proceedings were concluded. In addition, 
none of the Petitioners provided evidence that he or she has a pecuniary interest in 
Questar Gas or seeks to represent such an interest so as to have a claim for standing 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(a). This Court has repeatedly held that a 
petition for reconsideration is a jurisdictional prerequisite for appeal. Therefore, the 
appeal of the 2006 Order should be dismissed. 
39
 See e.g., Beaver County, 2001 UT 81, U 29-30. ("[The Court is] without 
jurisdiction to review administrative orders unless and until the [Petitioners] apply for 
review or rehearing pursuant to section 54-7-15 of the Utah Code."); Williams v. Public 
Serv. Comm % 754 P.2d 41, 48-49 (Utah 1988) C'[T]he parties' failure to request 
rehearing before the PSC leaves this Court without subject matter jurisdiction over the 
petition . . . ."'). 
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For the reasons set forth in the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss in 
Case No. 20060280-SC (Addendum 6), Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes' appeal of the 
Intervention Order should be dismissed. The grounds for their appeal are so insubstantial 
as not to merit further consideration by the Court. They inexcusably did not seek 
intervention until after all proceedings in the case were concluded. It is not even 
debatable that intervention at that point would have impaired the interests of justice and 
the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceeding. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
9(2)(b). Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes also failed to preserve issues for review in their 
Request for Reconsideration, and, by failing to seek a stay of the 2006 Order, they failed 
to preserve their right to appeal the 2006 Order and, therefore, review of the Intervention 
Order is moot. 
In addition, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes have failed to include any argument on the 
Intervention Order in their briefing to the Court, either intentionally waiving their appeal 
of the Intervention Order or seeking to place the burden on the Court to determine the 
merits of the appeal without the assistance of briefing. In either case, their inaction 
warrants dismissal of their appeal. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 26(c); MacKay v. Hardy, 
973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1998) ("This court, as well as the court of appeals, has held 
in numerous cases that we will not address issues not adequately briefed."); Phillips v. 
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 
*| 8, 995 P.2d 14 ("An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of the issue 
is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court.'"(citation omitted)). 
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B. The 2006 OrderIs Not Barred by Res Judicata. 
In various forms addressing factual allegations and legal argument, Petitioners' res 
judicata argument makes up a substantial portion of their Brief. They seek to confuse the 
matter before this Court—namely the Commission's 2006 Order allowing partial 
recovery for C02 processing costs starting February 1, 2005. Petitioners base their 
arguments solely on questions raised in the 2004 Order regarding cost recovery from 
June 1999 to May 2004. They mischaracterize the 2004 Order, asserting that it "finally, 
unequivocally, and conclusively disallows any and all gas processing costs" (Br. 61) and 
ignore the language in the 2004 Order and the Clarification Order that specifically limits 
the 2004 Order to the 1999-2004 time period and concludes that Questar Gas is not 
precluded from seeking to recover C02 processing costs in other dockets. Petitioners' res 
judicata claims lack merit. 
1. Res Judicata Does Not Apply Because the 2004 Order and the 2006 
Order Were Both Exercises in Legislative Ratemaking. 
This Court has consistently held that res judicata has only limited application in 
ratemaking proceedings. In Utah State Bd. of Regents v. Utah Public Serv. Comm 'n, 583 
P.2d 609 (Utah 1978), the Court observed that "[b]y their very nature, public utility rates 
are inescapably subject to constant circumspection and justification. The Commission is 
charged with the responsibility of establishing rates as are 'just and reasonable' and the 
propriety of such rates is forever subject to challenge upon complaint by interested 
parties who are entitled to a hearing and to introduce evidence." Id. at 611. 
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Petitioners cite Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 
846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), in support of their argument that the 2004 Order precludes 
recovery of C02 removal costs in this case. Br. 57. However, the case actually supports 
the 2006 Order. In Salt Lake Citizens, the petitioner made essentially the same argument 
Petitioners make here. It argued that a 1969 decision disallowing recovery for charitable 
contributions that had previously been allowed was res judicata with regard to recovery 
of future charitable contributions in other cases. 846 P.2d at 1250-51. The Court held 
that res judicata was inapplicable, stating, "What constitutes a just and reasonable rate of 
return, the cost of capital, and the various expense and revenue amounts cannot be 
decided on the basis of a prior rate proceeding, but must be determined anew . . . . " 
in each case. Id. at 1251 (emphasis added). The Court further observed that even if an 
expense is of a type involving a legal determination that has been previously adjudicated 
(and, therefore, may implicate stare decisis), the mere difference in the level of the 
expense from year to year is sufficient to prevent the application of res judicata.40 
This position is consistent with the holding of the Court in Utah Dept. of Admin. 
Services v. Public Serv. Comm % 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) ("Wexpro IF). One question 
in that appeal was whether an order approving transfers of property interests would be 
40
 See id; see also Reaveley v. Public Serv. Comm % 436 P.2d 797, 799-800 (Utah 
1968)0%[T]he law does not require an administrative body to be bound by the rules of 
stare decisis as applied to courts. . . . '[Administrative bodies are not ordinarily bound by 
their prior determinations or the principles or policies on which they are based.' . . . 
Certainly an administrative agency which has a duty to protect the public interest ought 
not be precluded from improving its collective mind should it find that a prior decision is 
not now in accordance with its present idea of what the public interest requires." (citation 
omitted)). 
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final. The Court said, "In contrast to the lack of finality that exists as to orders fixing 
public utility rates, the principles of res judicata apply to enforce repose when an 
administrative agency has acted in a judicial capacity in an adversary proceeding to 
resolve a controversy over legal rights and to apply a remedy." Id. at 621 (footnote 
omitted). Thus, principles of preclusion may apply to some decisions of the Commission, 
but not to ratemaking decisions. 
Consistent with these principles, "[t]he commission may at any time, upon notice 
to the public utility affected and after opportunity to be heard, rescind, alter, or amend 
any order or decision made by it." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-13. In addition, the 
Legislature has recently made clear in the Energy Resource Procurement Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 54-17-101, et seq., that a Commission decision to disallow recovery of the costs 
of a resource now "may not prejudice . . . the right of an energy utility to . . . seek 
recovery . . . in a future rate proceeding." Id. § 54-17-404(5)(a)(ii). 
When considered in light of these well-established principles, Petitioners' position 
is baseless, and completely inconsistent with the Commission's statutory ratemaking 
function and the Clarification Order. The 2006 Order found that the continued purchase 
of coal-bed methane and continued C02 removal to allow customers time to complete 
routine replacement or adjustment of their appliances was prudent from February 1, 2005 
going forward. R. 1144 at 38. As the evidence established, it was the preferred course of 
action. Id. at 36-38. Yet because the Commission had previously determined in the 1999 
general rate case that the Company had failed to meet its burden to demonstrate prudence 
sufficient to warrant rate recovery based on the evidence presented then, Petitioners now 
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argue that the preferred option for addressing coal-bed methane can never be pursued (at 
least if any rate recovery is involved). This view demonstrates a complete lack of 
understanding of the principles of ratemaking, and if followed would not only unfairly 
harm Questar Gas but unfairly harm its customers. 
Even assuming (contrary to the actual finding of the 2004 Order) that the 
Company's conduct in the 1990s was somehow imprudent, Petitioners' argument is 
plainly contrary to ratemaking principles and the public interest. For example, assume 
that an electric utility built a generating plant in 1998, but that the output of the plant was 
not needed at that time or that the cost of electricity from the plant was much more 
expensive than reliable alternative sources of supply. The Commission might find that 
the utility could not demonstrate that the costs associated with production of electricity 
from the plant in 1998 were prudently incurred and disallow all or some part of them. 
However, assume that in 2006, based on changes in demand or market prices for other 
sources of supply, the electricity from the plant is both necessary and favorably priced. 
The Commission would clearly be justified in allowing the utility to include the cost of 
electricity from the plant in current rates, and its failure to do so would be contrary to the 
interests of customers. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-17-404(5)(a)(ii). 
This is similar to what occurred here. Questar Gas did not meet its burden of 
proof to recover processing costs in the 1999 to 2004 time period and, as a result, 
refunded $29 million to customers and recovered no C02 removal costs prior to February 
of 2005. But as facts and circumstances changed and as Questar Gas put on a compelling 
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case meeting its burden of proof, the Commission appropriately allowed cost recovery for 
a different time period, based on different facts and circumstances. 
As the Court has consistently held and as the Legislature has made clear, res 
judicata does not bar the Commission allowing expenses of a type previously disallowed 
if the evidence supports a finding that the expenses are currently prudently incurred. 
2. Claim Preclusion Does Not Apply. 
Even if the 2006 Order constituted the type of Commission decision to which res 
judicata might apply, neither the claim preclusion nor the issue preclusion branch of res 
judicata would be applicable in this case. 
The claim preclusion branch of res judicata deals with previously adjudicated 
claims and causes of action, and bars the re-litigation of any claim or cause of action that 
has been the subject of a prior final judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Maoris & 
Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ffi| 17-20, 16 P.3d 1214. Three elements 
must be present in order for a claim to be precluded: "First, both cases must involve the 
same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have 
been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in 
the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." 
See id. ("All three elements must be present for claim preclusion to apply.") (citation 
omitted). 
Petitioners assert that claim preclusion applies based on the 2004 Order, but that 
assertion is erroneous. At a minimum, the second requirement of claim preclusion is 
missing from this case. The "claim" for recovery rejected by the Commission in the 2004 
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Order was the claim for partial recovery of CO2 removal costs incurred from June 1999 
through May 2004. The claim at issue in this case was for partial recovery of costs 
incurred since February 1, 2005. The two are simply not the same claim or cause of 
action. 
The cases cited by Petitioners in support of their res judicata argument are either 
inapposite or fail to support their argument. For example, in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. 
Pa. Public Util Comm 'n, 433 A.2d 620 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), the utility sought re-
litigation of precisely the same $10.5 million dollars that had been disallowed previously 
due to imprudent construction management. See id. at 624. It claimed that it was entitled 
to raise the same claim again because "it did not have the opportunity to assert its rights 
and fully litigate the question of the quality of the construction of Salem Unit No. 1 in the 
prior rate proceeding." Id. at 626. Likewise, Coalition ofCities for Affordable Utility 
Rates v. Public Util Comm % 798 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1990), deals with the re-litigation of 
the same claim. In fact, the court noted that if the claim were not the same, the 
"imposition of res judicata principles would be inappropriate." Id. at 563.41 
The costs that the Company seeks to recover in this case are simply not the same 
costs covered by the 2004 Order. The costs addressed by the 2004 Order have already 
been borne by Questar Gas, and no one is suggesting that those costs can now be 
revisited. Rather, as the 2006 Order expressly stated, "Questar Gas will not recover any 
gas management operations costs incurred prior to February 1, 2005." R. 1144 at 40. 
41
 Petitioners also cite In re Tariff Filing ofCVPS, 769 A.2d 668 (Vt. 2001)(in this 
case a party sought to relitigate an issue identical to the issue that had been litigated in a 
previous proceeding). 
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In issuing the 2006 Order, the Commission considered factual circumstances that 
had never been addressed before in any of the previous coal-bed methane-related dockets. 
Petitioners' attempt to portray this case as turning on the issues from the 1999 rate case 
and before rather than contemporary evidence of today's circumstances is baseless. 
Coal-bed methane continues to be produced every day, and every day the Company must 
decide how best to respond to the availability of the gas. The undisputed evidence 
showed that the production of coal-bed methane in close proximity to the Company's 
system has been a tremendous boon to customers. Id. at 37, 39. Not only has the new 
source of gas saved customers substantial amounts in purchased gas costs, it has replaced 
dwindling supplies of other sources of gas. Id. 1144 at 34. 
The Commission determined that the Company responded prudently today to the 
production of coal-bed methane near the Company's distribution system. That question 
was addressed transparently and appropriately in this case, and claim preclusion has no 
applicability to this matter. 
3. Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply. 
The issue preclusion branch of res judicata prevents any issue directly adjudicated 
or necessarily involved in the determination of a prior action from being re-litigated in 
any future action between the same parties or their privies. Career Service Review Bd. v. 
Utah Dept. ofCorr., 942 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah 1997). Four elements are required to 
establish issue preclusion: "(1) The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be 
identical to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there must be a final judgment 
on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted must be a party in privity 
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with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the issue in the first action must be 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated." Id. (emphasis added). 
In this case, at least the first and fourth elements of issue preclusion are missing. 
The issues resolved by the 2006 Order were not the same issues resolved by the 
Commission in the 2004 Order as required to invoke the first element. Nor were the 
issues addressed by the 2006 Order litigated at all in the 1999 rate case, let alone 
"completely and fully" litigated as required to invoke the fourth element. In the current 
proceeding, the Commission was neither addressing the issue of whether the costs 
covered by the C02 Stipulation from the 1999 rate case were prudently incurred nor was 
it otherwise remotely addressing costs incurred during the period covered by the 2004 
Order. The issue addressed in this case, whether C02 removal costs incurred since 
February 1, 2005 were prudently incurred sufficient to warrant partial rate recovery, was 
not addressed in the 2004 Order or at any other previous time. 
Petitioners seek to distort this conclusion by misrepresenting the intended scope of 
the 2004 Order, claiming that the decision "finally, unequivocally, and conclusively 
disallows any and all gas processing costs." Br. 61 n. 19. The trouble for Petitioners, 
however, is that the Commission expressly disavowed any such reading of the 2004 
Order in its Clarification Order, where it correctly concluded that: 
The [2004 Order] addressed only Questar's failure to 
substantiate approval of the C02 Stipulation in these proceedings 
and our necessary rejection of the Stipulation, which would have 
permitted recovery of some processing costs through May of 
2004. Our reference to the May 2004 end date was dictated by 
the Stipulation's terms and was not intended to have any other 
preclusive effect on recovery by Questar. In regards to 
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Questar's requests for clarification and reconsideration, we 
state that our 2006 Order does not preclude Questar from 
seeking recovery of C0 2 processing costs in other dockets.... 
We will need to wait for Questar to make whatever arguments 
and present whatever evidence it deems appropriate in seeking 
recovery of these costs, whether incurred pre- or post-May 2004, 
in whatever dockets Questar may raise the issue. 
Clarification Order at 4-5. If the 2004 Order did "not preclude Questar from seeking 
recovery of C02 processing costs in other dockets," it could not have "finally, 
unequivocally, and conclusively disallow[ed] any and all gas processing costs" as 
Petitioners claim. The Commission contemplated further proceedings in a separate 
docket (this case) to address a long-term solution to coal-bed methane located in close 
proximity to the Company's distribution system. 2004 Order at 38-39. Such action was 
completely consistent with its ratemaking function. Thus, issue preclusion is not 
applicable based on the facts and circumstances in this case. 
4. The Examination of Prudent Alternatives Was Not Foreclosed by 
Actions or Inactions in the 1990s. 
The undisputed evidence in this case is that Questar Gas could not have foreseen 
the dramatic increase in coal-bed methane production sooner than it did. Even assuming 
contrary to that evidence as Petitioners do that Questar Gas should have acted sooner in 
the 1990s, one of the most consistent, erroneous themes in Petitioners' Brief is the theme 
that the Company's actions or inactions in the 1990s forever "foreclosed" possible 
alternatives for dealing with coal-bed methane, and that current problems associated with 
the gas all stem from that prior period. See, e.g., Br. 66-69. Thus, according to 
Petitioners, the Company can never demonstrate that it is prudently addressing coal-bed 
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methane because it will forever be stuck with the supposed errors of the past that cannot 
now be corrected. Br. 62-63. 
Petitioners claim to find support for their view of "foreclosed" options in the 
Commission's 2004 Order, but such support does not exist. When the Commission 
spoke of options that could no longer be pursued in the context of the 2004 Order, it was 
speaking of the fact that the Company was requesting rate recovery in its 1999 general 
rate case (delayed until 2004 by virtue of an extended appellate and remand process), 
based on a record from the late 1990s. Obviously, the facts at issue in the 2004 Order 
had long since passed and could not be undone, and any concerns the Commission had 
with the facts at issue could only be expressed in terms of what might have been. 
However, looking at the circumstances as they exist today, there is no imminent 
safety crisis associated with coal-bed methane. The existence of the C02 Removal Plant 
put-off that crisis at no cost to Questar Gas customers. Thus, there was no question of 
"what might have been" in this proceeding. Rather, as the Commission and parties 
considered the appropriate long-term solution to dealing with coal-bed methane in this 
proceeding, they could and did consider 14 alternatives to see which would best benefit 
customers and avoid affiliate conflicts of interest. It was not too late to consider these 
alternatives in this case as the parties were addressing solutions in real time. Petitioners 
cite no record evidence to suggest that any alternative was foreclosed in reviewing this 
issue on a forward-going basis. Coal-bed methane continues to be produced and, as a 
result, regulators and the Company must continue to consider how to address it. This is a 
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classic ratemaking scenario to which res judicata does not apply. As the Commission 
stated: 
Our prior finding that the Company failed to demonstrate prudence 
in its decision to contract for construction and operation of the C02 
Removal Plant during the 1997 and 1998 time frame is relevant only 
to the extent the same conditions present in 1997 and 1998 continue 
to be present. Based on the evidence presented in these dockets, it is 
apparent these conditions have changed. 
R. 1144 at 33. 
The Court should consider these facts and circumstances when judging the validity 
of Petitioners' dramatic criticisms of "lap-dog" regulators (R. 685 at 16) and protestations 
that Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes are the only ones left to look-out for ratepayers.42 By 
pursuing the course of action chosen by the regulators and Questar Gas after thorough 
investigation, Questar Gas is providing from $13 million to $23 million per year of net 
savings for customers when compared with an option (going to FERC) that Petitioners 
fault the Company for not pursuing.43 
R. 1156 at 74 (The Commission "surely must now permit the ratepayers to 
retain their own attorneys and champion their own and the public interests when all other 
advocates have abandoned them."). 
43
 Savings in purchased gas costs and other capacity related savings resulting from 
the presence of coal-bed methane and Mainline 104 in 2003 and 2004 as shown on 
Exhibit 4.7 (R. 291) were $18,295,522 or approximately $9 million per year. Adding the 
additional processing costs that would be imposed for Company-owned gas if Questar 
Gas had gone to FERC and been successful in obtaining stricter standards for gas on 
Questar Pipeline of $8 million to $18 million per year (R. 292), indicates that the strategy 
pursued by the Company and approved by the regulators has saved customers from $17 
million to $27 million per year. And these savings are expected to continue at 
approximately the same level in the future. R. 283 at 29. The portion of C02 removal 
costs that Questar Gas will recover under the Stipulation is estimated to be approximately 
$4 million per year before any benefit from the revenue sharing from third-party 
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Petitioners present analogies such as burning down the uninsured headquarters 
building that essentially say that Questar Gas was denied recovery of C02 processing 
costs in the past because its actions in the 1990s created the need for those costs and that 
it is forever barred from recovery of C02 processing costs in the future because of those 
actions. These analogies fail on all fronts. 
First, the premise that Questar Gas was denied recovery because of its actions in 
the 1990s is incorrect. Questar Gas was denied recovery because it failed to meet its 
burden of proof, not because it was found to have acted improperly. See 2004 Order at 
38. Second, the Clarification Order specifically said that Questar Gas was not barred 
from seeking recovery of these costs in a future proceeding. See Clarification Order at 5. 
Third, in the forward-looking proceeding that ultimately resulted in the 2006 Order, the 
Commission concluded that coal-bed methane is beneficial to the Company's customers, 
in obtaining substantial gas cost savings, and that it should be part of the Company's gas 
supply. R. 1144 at 34. Fourth, the record demonstrated that all alternatives had been 
considered and that there was no evidence to suggest that any alternative had been 
foreclosed by the Company's prior actions in the 1990s. Id. at 21, 36-38. Fifth, the 
record demonstrated that going to FERC to seek to keep Questar Gas an island in the 
interstate pipeline grid would have been much more costly to Questar Gas and its 
customers than the costs of removing C02 from coal-bed methane. Id. at 35. 
processing. R. 1144 at 48-49. Accordingly, the net savings to customers will be from 
$13 million to $23 million per year. 
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The Commission never found or concluded that Questar Gas had done anything 
remotely akin to burning down its uninsured headquarters building in reviewing costs 
from 1999 to 2004. In the 2006 Order, Questar Gas was found to be prudent and coal-
bed methane beneficial. Petitioners' claim and issue preclusion arguments lack merit. 
C. The Commission's Finding of Prudence Is Supported by Substantial, 
Competent Evidence, and Its Sound Ratemaking Decision Should Not Be 
Second-Guessed. 
Petitioners do not attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the 2006 Order in 
their Brief. To the contrary, they studiously avoid even discussing the verified 
application and sworn testimony and exhibits filed by Questar Gas and barely refer to the 
live testimony submitted in the hearing. Instead, Petitioners argue that there is no 
competent evidence in the record to support the 2006 Order. Br. 74-75. However, they 
fail to explain why any specific portion of the evidence is incompetent. This argument is 
wrong in light of the substantial sworn and competent testimony admitted into evidence 
in this case. In any event, Petitioners cannot belatedly object to the admission of 
evidence on the grounds of incompetence. 
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm % 152 P.2d 542, 555 (Utah 
1944), the Court characterized the Commission's ratemaking authority as "broad and 
sweeping in scope" limited by two principles: "first, that the Commission proceed by 
notice and hearing; and second, that the rates established conform to the standard of 'just 
and reasonable.'"44 In light of this broad authority, the Court has also consistently held 
44
 See also Questar Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 2001 UT 93 at ^ 11-12 
(quoting Utah Dept. of Bus. Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm yn, 720 P.2d 420, 424 n. 4 
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that it will not interfere with the Commission's exercise of these broad powers if 
decisions are based on substantial, competent evidence. FBI Freight Service v. Public 
Serv. Comm 9n, 598 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Utah 1979) ("It is well settled that this Court 
will not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission and its findings will not be 
disturbed when they are supported by competent evidence.").45 
The Court has also consistently held that a party challenging an order of the 
Commission must marshal the evidence in support of the order and then demonstrate why 
that evidence does not support the Commission's findings.46 If a party fails to marshal 
the evidence, the Court has held that the party waives any objection to the sufficiency of 
the evidence.47 Petitioners have clearly not marshaled the evidence in support of the 
(Utah 1986) (the Commission has "ample general power to fix rates and establish 
accounting procedures"); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 682 P.2d 858, 
860 (Utah 1984) (the Commission has "considerable latitude in performing its rate-
regulation function" and "broad supervisory powers in relation to rates"); Mountain 
States Tel and Tel Co. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n9 754 P.2d 928, 931-32 (Utah 1988) 
("Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (1986) gives the Commission broad discretion in establishing 
rates for public utilities. Any activities that are related to rate making are therefore 
subject to the Commission's broad powers in this area.") (citation omitted). 
45
 See also Utah Dept. of Bus. Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 734 P.2d 431, 
433 (Utah 1986); Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm % 672 P.2d 728, 
730 (Utah 1983). 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 861 P.2d 414, 424 
(Utah \993)(quoting First Nat 7 Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 
1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)("Under the [Utah Administrative Procedures Act], the aggrieved 
party 'must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the 
supporting facts, the [agency's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence."). 
See also Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 19, Tanner, 2001 UT 18, U 17. 
47
 Chen, 2004 UT 82, | 19, Tanner, 2001 UT 18, U 17. See also Atlas Steel, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm '«, 2002 UT 112, ffi[ 40-41, 61 P.3d 1053("[An] eleventh-hour 
attempt to marshal the evidence and challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the reply 
brief is too late. . . . An appellant seeking to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
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2006 Order. Nonetheless, Questar Gas will briefly review the substantial evidence in 
support of the 2006 Order and the Commission's finding of prudence and will 
demonstrate that the evidence is competent. 
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the 2006 Order and the Commission's 
Finding of Prudence. 
One reading Petitioners' Brief might assume that the only evidence submitted by 
the parties in support of the Stipulation was the live testimony presented at the hearing on 
October 20, 2005. Petitioners do not discuss the verified application filed January 31, 
2005 or the overwhelming, sworn evidence filed on April 15, 2005, both of which were 
admitted without objection and carefully considered by the Commission in reaching its 
decision. In addition and contrary to Petitioners' mischaracterization (Br. 82-83), three 
knowledgeable and qualified witnesses provided live testimony in support of the 
Stipulation at the hearing on October 20, 2005. The Commission reviewed all of that 
evidence in reaching its decision finding the Company's actions were prudent and that 
approval of the Stipulation was just and reasonable and in the public interest. 
The general content of the substantial evidence is included in the statement of 
facts, above. It was also described in the 2006 Order. It showed that the declining heat-
content of gas supplies in the Rocky Mountain area is beyond the control of Questar Gas 
and its affiliates, and that the development of large quantities of coal-bed methane 
geographically near the Company's system has provided, and will continue to provide, 
support a finding of fact must undertake and meet its heavy marshaling burden in its 
opening memorandum of law on appeal. An appellant cannot hold its sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge in reserve and wait to marshal the evidence in its reply brief"). 
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substantial benefits to the Company's customers both in lowering their rates and in 
replacing declining production from other sources. It established that the costs incurred 
by Questar Gas to process coal-bed methane in the C02 Removal Plant are the same as if 
Questar Gas owned the plant itself and less than if it were owned by an unaffiliated, third 
party. Finally, the undisputed evidence established that had the matter gone to hearing, 
the Division and the Committee would have recommended a result in the range of the 
result they negotiated in the Stipulation. 
In this case, Questar Gas did not simply bring its business decision to the 
Commission for approval, it made the decision in a public, collaborative process 
involving regulators and other interested participants. The process was described and 
reviewed in detail in the verified application filed January 31, 2005 and the sworn 
testimony filed April 15 and was further briefly reviewed in the live testimony presented 
without objection on October 20, 2005. 
It is not a close call as to whether substantial evidence supports the 2006 Order. 
Rather, Petitioners choose to completely ignore that overwhelming evidence and focus 
instead on a claim that the evidence considered by the Commission was from the wrong 
timeframe or that it was incompetent. Br. 74-75. Petitioners are wrong on the first claim 
for all the reasons set forth in the discussion of res judicata above. The Commission 
considered the evidence from the appropriate timeframe in addressing what a prudent 
utility would do now in response to the increasing production of coal-bed methane 
throughout the state, the region, and the nation. Petitioners are wrong on the second 
claim for the reasons discussed below. 
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2. The Evidence Was Competent, and Petitioners' Objection Is Too Late. 
Petitioners' Brief makes the sweeping assertion that "every scrap" of evidence in 
the record was hearsay. Br. 53. But Petitioners do not support any claim that the 
evidence was all hearsay under evidentiary standards (to the extent those standards apply 
to the Commission's legislative ratemaking function). Petitioners cannot, for example, 
legitimately fault as "hearsay" the verified application or the sworn, written testimony of 
obviously qualified experts or the fact testimony of most of the same witnesses based on 
their personal knowledge and observation that was the basis for their opinions. Nor can 
Petitioners assert that the experts did not reasonably rely on facts of a type reasonably 
relied on by experts in their particular fields. See Utah R. Evid. 703. 
Indeed, Petitioners do not even attempt to undermine the Company's verified 
application or the sworn written testimony and exhibits. Instead, they inaccurately assert 
that pre-filed testimony is insufficient to meet a utility's burden of persuasion, citing the 
statement from Utah Dept. of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm >?, 614 P.2d 
1242, 1245-46 (Utah 1980), that "[t]he company must support its application by way of 
substantial evidence, and the mere filing of schedules and testimony in support of a rate 
increase is insufficient to sustain the burden." Br. 84. But Petitioners' reliance on that 
48
 The witnesses were Barrie L. McKay, M.A., a Certified Public Accountant and 
Manager of Regulatory Affairs for Questar Gas (R. 237); Lawrence Conti, an engineer 
and General Manager of Operations and Gas Control for Questar Pipeline (R. 248); 
Robert A. Lamarre, a petroleum geologist who was the chief geologist on the Ferron 
coal-bed methane gas field (R. 281); Alan J. Walker, Manager of Gas Supply for Questar 
Gas (R. 283 at 3-4); Robert O. Reid, Ph.D., economist specializing in modeling natural 
gas price differentials, including in the Rocky Mountain region (R. 297 at 3-7); and 
Charles Benson, M.E., an engineer specializing in gas quality standards and 
interchangeability. R. 306. 
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case is misplaced. This was a case where the utility submitted overwhelming, credible, 
uncontradicted evidence that the Commission was not free to ignore. See, e.g., US 
WEST Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm % 901 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1995) 
{quoting Jones v. California Packing Corp., 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 1952) ("The law 
does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard 
uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence . . . .").49 
Petitioners attack the live testimony presented in the hearing on October 20, 2005 
as unqualified, policy testimony and hearsay. Br. 85. However, Petitioners do not bother 
to say specifically why the testimony was unqualified or hearsay. The fact is that each 
witness who provided testimony on October 20 was a person with extensive experience 
in public utility regulation and who has presented expert testimony before the 
Commission on many occasions.50 Each was fully competent to testify to the background 
and purposes of the Stipulation and the negotiations that led to the Stipulation. Each 
participated in the negotiations and in the discovery and analyses of the facts underlying 
the positions of the parties. Each participated in the technical conferences. Mr. McKay, 
the Questar Gas witness, had personal knowledge through his work for the Company of 
49
 The general practice before the Commission is to file direct, rebuttal and 
surrebuttal testimony and exhibits prior to a hearing. At the hearing, witnesses make any 
necessary corrections to their filed testimony and then usually present a brief summary. 
They are then subjected to cross examination. However, the vast bulk of the evidence is 
presented through the pre-filed testimony. If Petitioners' argument were correct, almost 
no order of the Commission would be sustainable because almost all findings are deeply 
rooted in the pre-filed testimony and exhibits. 
50
 The testimony was presented by Mr. McKay for Questar Gas {see footnote 48 
supra)\ William A. Powell, Ph.D., economist and Acting Manager of the Energy Section 
for the Division; and Dan Gimble, Chief of Technical Staff for the Committee. R. 2297. 
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many of the facts underlying the technical conferences, the verified application, the 
sworn testimony, the discovery process and the negotiations. Dr. Powell and 
Mr. Gimble, longtime employees of the Division and Committee, respectively, were well 
aware of the internal analyses of these parties and their outside experts and of the 
positions the parties planned to take if the matter had proceeded to hearing. There is 
simply no basis for Petitioners' claim that this evidence was unqualified or hearsay. 
Furthermore, Petitioners' claims regarding the evidence are untimely. Hearsay 
objections must be preserved at the time the evidence is offered, not months later in a 
petition for reconsideration. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 
1984)(uWhere there was no clear and definite objection on the basis of hearsay, that 
theory cannot now be raised on appeal."). By choosing not to participate in the case 
earlier and by not objecting to admission of the evidence on October 20, 2005, Petitioners 
waived any such objection.51 
In summary, there was an enormous amount of competent evidence in this case, 
and the witnesses relied on first-hand knowledge of the factual bases underlying their 
3
 Petitioners' claims are also misplaced because this Court has "repeatedly held 
that the hearsay rule does not apply in administrative hearings. An administrative agency 
must be guided by fairness in determining what evidence to accept and what to hold 
inadmissible. All that is necessary is that admitted evidence have some probative weight 
and reliability." Bunnell v. Industrial Comm }n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987) 
(citations omitted). Thus, the Commission is allowed to receive and rely on hearsay or 
incompetent evidence, but may not base a finding solely on such evidence. See Utah 
Admin. Code R746-100-1 O.F.I. See also Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 
339 P.2d 1011,1013-14 (Utah 1959) ("It is to be remembered that there is considerable 
difference between court trials and proceedings before administrative agencies. It is 
undisputable that the legislature intended that the latter should not be burdened with 
undue formality."). 
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opinions or on facts of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular fields at 
issue. The Commission's reliance on such testimony was completely appropriate and 
consistent with its rules and past practice. 
Lacking the capability to demonstrate that the evidence was incompetent or 
hearsay, Petitioners attempt to misdirect the Court yet again by claiming that "[m]uch if 
not most of the evidence upon which the Commission relied in issuing the January 2006 
Order was 'introduced' during discussion sessions, so-called 'technical conferences.'" 
Br. 82. In making this argument, however, Petitioners fail to acknowledge or dispute the 
Commission's statement in the 2006 Order that 
we base our findings and conclusions contained herein upon a 
thorough examination of the entire evidentiary record in these 
dockets and conclude that, absent any reliance on the noticed 
material [from the technical conferences], the overwhelming weight 
of evidence admitted in these proceedings, including testimony on 
the Stipulation, pre-filed testimony, and the facts asserted in the 
application, support both our conclusion that Questar Gas has acted 
prudently in evaluating and choosing among the available 
alternatives and our approval of the Stipulation. 
R. 1144 at 32 fn 18. In light of this clear statement, Petitioners' arguments about 
technical conferences are irrelevant. The Commission did not rely on the technical 
conferences in support of its findings or decision. Nonetheless, Questar Gas will 
demonstrate that Petitioners' arguments are also incorrect in section VI.F.l, below. 
D. The Commission Satisfied Due Process. 
Petitioners' Brief seeks to create a parade of horrors about how "dismal" the 
Commission's procedure was in this case in an effort to persuade the Court that the 
Commission should have ignored 15 months of proceedings and work and started over 
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when Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes submitted their untimely and unfounded complaints after 
the case was submitted and the Commission was in deliberations. Petitioners' attempt is 
deficient for several reasons. Petitioners' notice and due process claims suffer from the 
same defect that is fatal to the rest of their claims—Petitioners lack standing to assert 
their arguments because they chose not to intervene as parties in a proceeding they 
acknowledged they knew about. They do not qualify to seek reconsideration under 
section 54-7-15. Thus, there is no basis for them to be heard. Petitioners' notice and due 
process claims suffer from an additional defect, however, in that Petitioners have failed to 
allege any prejudice to themselves arising from the procedural problems they assert. 
Finally, the Commission followed appropriate procedures as specified in statutes and 
rules and complied with all requirements of due process. Petitioners' due process 
arguments are simply incorrect. 
1. Petitioners Must Take the Case as They Found It and Have Not 
Alleged Any Prejudice from the Alleged Procedural Errors. 
Petitioners' procedural arguments consist of nitpicking through the record after the 
fact looking for any potential technical procedural problem to attack, rather than 
substantive arguments that any of the Petitioners was actually harmed by any alleged 
procedural defect.52 But Petitioners are not entitled to make such generalized and 
Petitioners claim that the Commission's "docketing system is a shambles" (Br. 
89), without ever asserting that any of them actually tried to use it; that its "website is 
confusing and difficult to navigate" (id.), without ever alleging that any of them tried to 
navigate it; and that the notice provided of the hearing in this matter was insufficient (id. 
86), without ever saying that any of them (other than Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes—whose 
own notice arguments are baseless because of their admitted familiarity with the 
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untimely procedural attacks. "When intervention is permitted, the intervenor must accept 
the pending action as he finds it; his right to litigate is only as broad as that of the other 
parties to the action." Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 284-85 (Utah 1982) (citation 
omitted). This means that Petitioners "must join subject to the proceedings that have 
occurred prior to [their] intervention; [they] cannot unring the bell." See 7C Charles Alan 
Wright, et al, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1920 (2d ed. 1986) {quoting Hartley 
Pen Co. v. LindyPen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 153 (S.D. Cal. 1954)).53 
The rules requiring a later participant to take the case as he or she finds it and not 
"unring the bell" are all the more important to enforce in a case such as this where the 
late participation by Petitioners was driven by Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes, who apparently 
sought customer and alleged shareholder names to use in opposition to the Stipulation in 
an attempt to find a loophole (through Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15) around their own 
failure to seek timely intervention.54 Petitioners have absolutely no basis to complain 
about the notice or process provided in this matter. 
proceeding) would have sought to attend the hearing had the notice not allegedly been 
deficient. 
53
 See also Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F.Supp. 72, 76 n. 4 (M.D. Ala. 1983) 
(intervenors "not allowed to challenge prior orders, judgments, and decrees"); Galbreath 
v. Metro. Trust Co. of Cal., 134 F.2d 569, 570 (10th Cir. 1943) (intervenor "bound by all 
prior orders and adjudications of fact and law as though he had been a party from the 
commencement of the suit.") 
See Addendum 5 at 14-23 for discussion of shareholder entitlement to seek 
reconsideration. 
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2. The Commission's Notice Satisfied Due Process, 
Notice of the hearing in this matter was provided on October 11, 2005, nine days 
in advance of the hearing date. Commission Rule R746-100-10.A specifies that the 
Commission will normally give notice at least five days in advance of a hearing unless a 
shorter period is deemed reasonable by the Commission. Further, no hearing is required 
at all when all parties to the proceeding are in agreement with a settlement. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-7-l(3)(e)(ii). All parties had reached a settlement in this matter. Thus, 
the Commission went above and beyond the notice requirements of its rules and its 
statutory notice responsibility under section 54-7-1 by giving nine days notice. The 
Commission was clearly correct, therefore, to conclude that its notice was sufficient. 
Moreover, Petitioners should not be permitted to raise procedural objections when 
they failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to participate throughout the course of 
the proceedings.55 Petitioners complain that nine days of notice was insufficient to allow 
an interested person to participate in the hearing of this matter; but their complaint puts 
too much weight on the last procedural notice issued by the Commission. There was 
ample notice prior to that time of the matters at issue in this case, and a truly interested 
person would not have waited until the very last minute (when the hearing on the 
Stipulation was noticed and just a few weeks before the hearing on the merits was 
scheduled) to seek to participate. 
When the initial scheduling order was issued in this matter, on March 28, 2005, 
the Company's complete verified application seeking recovery of C02 removal costs had 
55
 See Lima, 657 P.2d at 284-85. 
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been on public file for nearly two months. The Commission stated in the 2004 Order 
that it would consider the long-term issue of how to address coal-bed methane in a 
separate docket and in the Clarification Order that Questar Gas was free to seek rate 
recovery for C02 removal in other dockets. 
It is disingenuous, therefore, for Petitioners to argue that an interested person 
reading such language from the Commission's Clarification Order would assume that the 
2004 Order had resolved the question of rate recovery for C02 removal costs once and 
for all. Rather, an interested person would have had many months prior to the hearing in 
this matter to ascertain that rate recovery for ongoing C02 removal costs was not 
foreclosed, and that Questar Gas was in fact seeking such recovery. Those facts alone 
would have put an interested person on inquiry notice to familiarize himself or herself 
with this case and determine whether he or she wanted to participate. 
Furthermore, Petitioners' claims are disingenuous in light of Mr. Ball's 
participation throughout the course of these proceedings in his role as director of the 
Committee's staff, including the Committee's participation in settlement discussions 
before the Company even filed its verified application in the consolidated docket. It was 
not the filing of the Stipulation that suddenly put rate recovery concretely at issue in this 
case, it was the filing of the Company's verified application on January 31, 2005 (and 
applications in earlier dockets) and its filing of sworn testimony on April 15, 2005. 
56
 And it had been public information for 10 months (since the Company's petition 
in Docket No. 04-057-04) or at least six months (since the Company's petition for 
reconsideration and the Commission's Clarification Order, following the 2004 Order) 
that Questar Gas would be seeking recovery for ongoing C02 removal costs. 
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Petitioners' argument that the Stipulation was "altered and redrawn completely" and 
"fashioned [] an entirely new compromise" (Br. 91), is also disingenuous. The verified 
application and sworn written testimony clearly sought recovery of CO2 removal costs. 
Petitioners' notice and process arguments are merely attempts at after-the-fact 
scrutiny of procedural details that caused them no injury. Mr. Ball's and Ms. Geddes' 
attempt to redo a 15-month proceeding that they previously chose not to participate in 
arose only after an outcome they did not like. If would-be intervenors do not take the 
case as they find it, the ability of a non-party to seek reconsideration under section 54-7-
15 will lead to a procedural nightmare. R. 1150 at 8, 14. Nothing in section 54-7-15 can 
appropriately be read as allowing Petitioners to completely unwind the Commission's 
proceedings in the manner they seek to accomplish. 
3. Chairman Campbell Was Not Required to Recuse Himself, and 
Petitioners Failed to Raise the Recusal Argument in a Timely Manner. 
Chairman Campbell's participation in this case was completely appropriate. 
Chairman Campbell's tenure as director of the Division ended nearly five years prior to 
the entry of the 2006 Order. The 2004 Order concluding the 1999 general rate case, in 
which Chairman Campbell participated for the Division, was not appealed and that case 
became forever final and unappealable thirty days after the Commission issued the 
Clarification Order. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a). That case was concluded 
prior to the beginning of this case and no aspect of this case revisited the determinations 
made in the 2004 Order. 
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Upon its rejection by the 2004 Order, the C02 Stipulation, entered by the Division 
while Chairman Campbell was director, also ceased to have any force or effect. Thus, 
there was nothing whatsoever remaining from Chairman Campbell's participation, as 
Division director, in the 1999 rate case. This was simply not the same case, nor a related 
case, to the 1999 proceeding. Despite Petitioners' unceasing attempts to stop the clock in 
1999 on all things related to coal-bed methane, neither Chairman Campbell's 
participation nor the partial rate recovery provided by the 2006 Order in this case had any 
pollution in them from Petitioners' proverbial well. Br. 63. 
Moreover, Chairman Campbell's participation in this matter was one of the issues 
that Petitioners were required to take as they found it. Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes certainly 
knew about Chairman Campbell's participation in the case. So would any person, for 
example, who attended the scheduling conference or any of the six technical conferences 
in Docket No. 04-057-09 or who attended the scheduling conference in the consolidated 
docket or read the Commission's scheduling order issued March 28, 2005, setting the 
schedule for proceedings on the Company's verified application (including the original 
notice of hearing, set for October 6, 2005). As Petitioners' acknowledge they are aware 
(Br. 53, 94), Chairman Campbell participated actively in the technical conferences and 
signed the scheduling order. R. 83. He actively participated throughout the Commission 
proceeding. There was nothing improper about that participation; and, in any event, it 
was too late for Petitioners to complain about it when they did. See, e.g., Madsen v. 
Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 767 P.2d 538, 542-43 (Utah 1988). The 
Commission could not efficiently manage its dockets if a non-party could come in after a 
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final order has been issued and criticize such matters, when it is too late to change the 
past and any corrective measures would involve starting the entire case over. Due 
process cannot conceivably impose such a requirement in circumstances such as the 
present case. 
E. The Commission Appropriately Approved the Stipulation. 
Petitioners argue that the Commission did not comply with section 54-7-1 because 
affiliate transaction are barred by section 54-4-26 and the contract for C02 processing 
required prior approval under the 1994 Planning Guidelines. These arguments lack merit. 
1. Affiliate Transactions Are Not Barred by Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-26, 
and the 1994 Planning Guidelines Do Not Require Pre-approval of the 
Contract for C0 2 Removal. 
Petitioners make the claim that affiliate transactions are barred by section 54-4-26 
of the Utah Code. Br. 13-14,75-78. Petitioners also claim that Questar Gas violated the 
1994 Planning Guidelines57 by failing to submit its contract with Questar Transportation 
for pre-approval. Id, These claims lack merit. 
The Commission has regularly approved expenses incurred in contracts with 
affiliates as just and reasonable for recovery in rates and this Court has regularly upheld 
such orders. See, e.g., Wexpro II, 658 P.2d at 604, 607, 616. The only requirement 
The 1994 Planning Guidelines arose out of an integrated resource planning 
process initiated in Docket No. 89-057-15. Pursuant to that process, Questar Gas 
submitted its first integrated resource plan ("IRP") on September 30, 1991. The 1994 
Planning Guidelines were issued on September 26, 1994. They provided that the 
Company would submit new IRPs every other year (erroneously referred to as 
^biennially" in the guidelines) and that it would submit an update to the new IRPs in off 
years. They establish an informal, non-adjudicatory planning process which is nothing 
like the process assumed by Petitioners in their Brief. 
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applicable to recovery of such expenses in addition to those applicable to any other 
expense is that affiliate expenses are subject to a higher level of scrutiny than are 
expenses incurred under contracts with unrelated third parties. See, e.g., US West 
Communications, 901 P.2d at 274. If affiliate transactions are barred by section 54-4-26, 
there is no need to subject them to any scrutiny, let alone higher scrutiny. 
Petitioners' argument is contrary to the language of section 54-4-26, which 
provides: 
Every public utility when ordered by the commission 
shall, before entering into any contract for construction work or 
for the purchase of new facilities or with respect to any other 
expenditures, submit such proposed contract, purchase or other 
expenditure to the commission for its approval; and, if the 
commission finds that any such proposed contract, purchase or 
other expenditure diverts, directly or indirectly, the funds of such 
public utility to any of its officers or stockholders or to any 
corporation in which they are interested, or is not proposed in 
good faith for the economic benefit of such public utility, the 
commission shall withhold its approval of such contract, 
purchase or other expenditure, and may order other contracts, 
purchases or expenditures in lieu thereof for the legitimate 
C O 
purposes and economic welfare of such public utility. 
Petitioners' Brief ignores the operative words in the statute *4when ordered by the 
[Commission." A public utility is only required to submit a contract to the Commission 
for pre-approval when the Commission has ordered it to do so. The policy behind this 
qualification is sound. Public utilities enter into hundreds, if not thousands, of business 
arrangements each year. If the Commission were required to review and pre-approve 
each of them, the utility could not operate efficiently nor could the Commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-26 (emphasis added). 
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Furthermore, if the Commission were required to pre-approve every utility expenditure, it 
would improperly intrude upon the role of utility management contrary to well-
established principles of law. See Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel Co. v. Public 
Serv. Comm Vz, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) ("'The Commission is not the financial manager 
of the corporation, and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the 
directors of the corporation . . . . ' " ) (quotation omitted); Wexpro II, 658 P.2d at 618 (Utah 
1983) ("the Commission is normally forbidden from intruding into the management of a 
utility") (citing Logan City v. Public Util Comm 'n, 296 P. 1006, 1008 (Utah 1931)). 
There is simply no bar against affiliate transactions in section 54-4-26 or elsewhere, and 
Petitioners implicitly recognize this in citing the standard for higher scrutiny and 
approval of affiliate transactions in their Brief. Br. 18. 
Petitioners discuss and misconstrue the 1994 Planning Guidelines extensively 
(e.g., Br. 22-25, 32-35) and argue that they required Questar Gas to submit its contract 
with Questar Transportation for pre-approval. Br. 76. The only portion of the guidelines 
cited by Petitioners' in support of this argument is a statement regarding ongoing 
concerns about the possibility that affiliate relationships might constrain acquisition 
decisions. That statement is: 
Affiliate relations remain a concern of this Commission. We do not 
presume that affiliate transactions are biased and not in the 
customers' best interests. However, the Commission puts the 
Company on notice that with regard to cost recovery of [the 
Company's] expenditures, we will view [the Company's] customers' 
interests as primary. Such interests shall not be subordinated to 
those of the corporate affiliates. All planning options that potentially 
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benefit [the Company's] ratepayers shall be investigated, whether or 
not they benefit subsidiaries of the Questar Corporation.59 
Petitioners then make the incredible leap to assert that this statement of Commission 
concern about affiliate issues equates to an order that all contracts with affiliates must be 
submitted for pre-approval. Br. 77. The Commission's language said no such thing.60 
Rather the Commission acknowledged that there was no presumption against affiliate 
transactions, but indicated that it would closely scrutinize them. 
Petitioners' argument also ignores the fact that the Commission scrutinized 
affiliated transactions in this case and found: 
The record also establishes that having the C02 Removal 
Plant owned and operated by Questar Transportation does not 
result in any prejudice to Questar Gas or its customers. The costs 
incurred by Questar Gas are the same as if the plant were owned 
and operated by Questar Gas. The provisions in the Stipulation 
. . . assure that the interests of Questar Gas's customers are given 
priority in this arrangement. 
While any activity involving a Questar Gas affiliate raises 
legitimate affiliate interest concerns, it is clear that it is the 
continuing integration of the nation's natural gas pipeline system, 
not affiliate interests, that is driving the increasing volumes of 
coal bed methane on the Questar Pipeline and Questar Gas 
systems. It is equally clear that safety, efficiency, and cost 
considerations, not affiliate interests, led Parties to conclude that 
^ 1994 Planning Guidelines at 3. See Br. Addendum 3. 
60
 Petitioners' argument on the 1994 Planning Guidelines, if they were 
adjudicative as represented by Petitioners (which they are not) would be an improper 
collateral attack on the IRP process. Petitioners' argument essentially amounts to a claim 
that Questar Gas and apparently the regulators have not complied with their obligations 
under the 1994 Planning Guidelines. There is no factual basis for this claim, and such a 
collateral attack would be prohibited. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14. 
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the operation of the C02 Removal Plant is the preferred course of 
action during the stipulated transition period. 
R. 1144 at 34-35, 37. 
Petitioners conclude this portion of their Brief by arguing that contracting with 
Questar Transportation is, by definition, diverting funds from Questar Gas to an affiliate 
contrary to section 54-4-26. Br. 77-78. As noted above, the Commission already 
considered whether the C02 removal arrangement was contrary to the interests of 
customers and concluded that it was not. If there were any requirement to be met under 
the 1994 Planning Guidelines, and there is not, this finding by the Commission shows 
compliance by Questar Gas. The questions raised in the 2004 Order about the contract in 
effect in 1998 were fully explored and answered by the evidence in this docket regarding 
the current arrangement from February 2005 going forward. There is no diversion of 
funds, only rate recovery for a portion of C02 removal costs, which recovery is expressly 
limited and does not offer any opportunity for diversion of funds. As noted above, the 
Commission made specific findings on Questar Gas receiving processing services from 
an affiliate and concluded that Questar Gas had put its customers' interests before those 
of its affiliate. R. 1144 at 37-38. 
2. The Absence of the Contract with Questar Transportation Was 
Inconsequential. 
Petitioners complain that the contract between Questar Gas and Questar 
Transportation was not on the record in the dockets on appeal. Br. 77. While Petitioners 
are correct in this observation, the absence of the contract has no bearing on approval of 
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the Stipulation.61 The Stipulation provides the terms and conditions upon which Questar 
Gas will receive rate recovery for C02 removal costs. It does not matter what the prior 
arrangement between Questar Gas and Questar Transportation provided, nor does it 
matter what the current arrangement will be; Questar Gas will only receive rate recovery 
in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation and the Commission will retain 
jurisdiction over Questar Gas and its rates to ensure that this takes place. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-4-4. There was no requirement that the contract be submitted for approval and 
no need to have it in the record. 
3. The Commission Met the Requirements for Approval of Settlements. 
Petitioners make an unclear argument that the Commission did not comply with 
the requirements for approval of settlements in section 54-7-1. Br. 78-97. Specifically, 
Petitioners cite the requirements that the Commission must find that settlement is the 
appropriate way to resolve the case and that the Commission must consider the 
significant and material facts related to the case. Br. 78. 
This argument is difficult to understand in light of the 2006 Order. The 2006 
Order clearly found that the settlement was just and reasonable in result and that the 
evidence in the record supported such a finding. R. 1144 at 38. The Commission 
deliberated two and one-half months before issuing the carefully reasoned and considered 
This case is not about the contract for C02 removal services, nor is it about 
reviewing whether Questar Transportation was prudent in building the a C02 Removal 
Plant. It is simply about whether Questar Gas can recover costs it incurs for C02 
removal. 
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2006 Order. There is no basis to assume that the Commission did not consider whether 
settlement was an appropriate means to resolve the case. 
Given the placement of this argument in the Brief, Petitioners apparently are 
arguing, similar to the foregoing arguments, that the Commission did not appropriately 
consider affiliate interests in approving the Stipulation. However, the 2006 Order did 
address affiliate interest issues. R. 1144 at 28-29, 37-38. Therefore, the argument has no 
merit on its face. 
Petitioners' Brief also faults the Commission for failing to follow the requirements 
of section 54-7-1 to consider all "significant" and "material facts" by not considering the 
supposed conflict that exists between having appliance inspection and adjustment 
completed quickly, on the one hand, and receiving rate coverage for C02 removal, on the 
other hand. Br.80-81. Petitioners' principal complaint is that the Commission noted in 
the 2004 Order that the original projection for completion of appliance inspection and 
adjustment was four years, and that, according to Petitioners, "[i]f this strategy had been 
followed, when proposed by the Utility in 1998, the appliance adjustment program would 
have been completed in 2002." Id. 80. The fact the Petitioners conveniently ignore is 
that the four-year expedited appliance adjustment program would have cost customers 
over $100 million, much more than C02 removal for the transition period. 
Petitioners cite a question raised in the 2004 Order that affiliate interests might 
cause the Company to delay the completion of the appliance inspection and adjustment in 
order to obtain further revenues from the C02 Removal Plant. What Petitioners fail to 
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note, however, is that when Questar Gas sought clarification on the Commission's 
meaning regarding this point, the Commission stated that: 
The language used in our Order's discussion was used as part of 
our expression of the regulatory concern of how affiliate interests 
and corporate relationships can present conflicts to the interests 
of a utility and its customers. . . . [0]ur Order is not intended 
to make specific findings that Questar actually took specific, 
calculated steps to delay customer actions with regard to 
their appliances, to the detriment of customer interests and to 
the benefit of corporate interests. Our difficulty was in finding 
substantial evidence that Questar recognized and addressed the 
conflicts presented by the developing circumstances and that 
Questar's actions were not unduly influenced by affiliate 
interests as it took the steps it did and did not consider and 
follow. 
Clarification Order at 3 (emphasis added). 
In light of the Commission's clarifying statement, there is no support for 
Petitioners' assertion that the Commission found Questar Gas to have intentionally 
delayed the implementation of the appliance inspection and adjustment program. 
Further, as demonstrated previously, there is no basis for Petitioners' claim that the 
Commission failed to address affiliate issues in the context of the operation of the C02 
Removal Plant. Br. 79. Finally, there is no basis for any inference that Questar Gas has 
done anything to delay the implementation of the Green Sticker Program. To the 
contrary, the Company has pursued it vigorously through contractor training, press 
releases, billing inserts and other promotional activities that began in 1998. 
The Commission clearly considered all "significant" and "material facts" and 
based its findings on the need for a just and reasonable result as required by section 54-7-
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1. Petitioners' claims that the Commission failed to follow the requirements of section 
54-7-1 are baseless. 
F. Petitioners' Other Arguments Are Irrelevant and Unpersuasive 
Petitioners make several additional arguments that are not relevant to the issues 
before the Court and that are unpersuasive. Questar Gas will not attempt to address each 
of these arguments made in Petitioners' 100-page Brief. However, it will briefly 
demonstrate that two of the more egregious arguments are incorrect. 
1. Technical Conferences Are Appropriate Vehicles for the Commission's 
Investigative and Legislative Ratemaking Functions. 
Petitioners complain that technical conferences are deficient vehicles for exploring 
issues in an administrative proceeding, and that the Commission may not rely on 
anything it learned through such conferences in this case. Br. 82-84. This argument is 
irrelevant because the Commission expressly did not rely on information from the 
technical conferences. R. 1144 at 32 fn 18. But even if the Commission had relied on 
the information, Petitioners fail to grasp the Commission's investigative and legislative 
ratemaking functions, which the Commission appropriately exercised in this case. 
Technical conferences are, among other things, publicly-noticed meetings that allow the 
Commission and interested persons to investigate a utility's actions and to ensure that the 
utility is fulfilling its responsibilities to provide safe and adequate service at just and 
reasonable rates. They are an often-used and effective method for the Commission to 
fulfill its legislative and investigative functions, and they were appropriately used in this 
case. 
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The principal value of the information from the technical conferences, which was 
included in the verified application and the sworn testimony, was in helping the 
Commission to evaluate the thoroughness and documentation of the decision-making 
process, the interests of the public and parties, any affiliate conflict issues that might be 
present, and the acceptability of the Stipulation in light of the settlement requirements of 
section 54-7-1. All of these things go toward the Commission's legislative ratemaking 
function, and there would have been nothing improper about the Commission considering 
the technical conferences in this context even absent the application or testimony. 
Further, much of Petitioners' attack is focused on the assertion that the technical 
conferences were held in a separate docket. In fact, the technical conferences were 
from the same consolidated docket in which the 2006 Order was issued (and in which the 
Stipulation was filed) that is now on appeal, and in any event Petitioners' view of the 
state of the law with regard to the Commission taking administrative notice is simply 
wrong.63 
Br. 82. Petitioners' cite Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co, v. Public Util Comrn'n, 17 
P.2d 287 (Utah 1932),. That case is distinguishable because in it the Commission based 
its decision in one case on matters from an entirely different case without formally taking 
notice of the evidence and allowing the parties an opportunity to address it. The 
Commission took notice of the information here in a public hearing at which parties 
could address the information, and the information was from the same consolidated case. 
63
 Petitioners wrongly claim that under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(b), the 
Commission may only take administrative notice of "facts in a record from other 
proceedings where those facts could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." Br. 82. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is an obvious 
misreading of the statute, however, which actually states: "(b) On his own motion or 
upon objection by a party, the presiding officer . . . (iv) may take official notice of any 
facts that could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of 
other proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts within the 
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2. The "Cheap Gas Exception" Argument Reveals Petitioners' Lack of 
Understanding of Prudence and Overreaching Position. 
Petitioners acknowledge the savings to Questar Gas customers that come from 
coal-bed methane, but dismiss them on the claim that this is not the issue. They say that 
Questar Gas has a duty to provide gas to its customers at the lowest reasonable cost. 
They conclude by saying that the fact that coal-bed methane provides cheap gas does not 
create an exception to prudence. They call this the "cheap gas" exception.64 
Petitioners' argument is revealing. It does not appear to matter to Petitioners that 
customers pay substantially less for gas and processing combined today, than they would 
for natural gas absent the availability of coal-bed methane. They are willing to ignore 
this benefit because of their belief that the benefit has been tainted by affiliated interest 
conflicts. It does not matter to them that the Commission concluded in the 2006 Order 
that there was no improper affiliate influence in the decision making for the period in 
question. 
This argument reveals two things. First, Petitioners do not understand prudence. 
If a utility provides safe, reliable and adequate service at just and reasonable rates, it is 
prudent. It does not matter whether an affiliate is involved. To be sure, the Commission 
must carefully examine the affiliate interest to assure that it has not improperly 
agency's specialized knowledge." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(l)(b)(iv). Thus, while 
Petitioners improperly argue that the three identified aspects of notice must all be 
satisfied for notice to be appropriate, in fact the subsection identifies three independent 
grounds for taking administrative notice, one of which is "the record of other proceedings 
before the agency." 
64
 Br. 68-69. This is obviously an attempt to link to the Court's 2003 Decision 
saying there was not a safety exception to prudence. 
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influenced the decision in a manner that has impaired service or increased costs, but the 
mere existence of an affiliate interest does not transform a prudent action into an 
imprudent one. 
Second, the argument reveals the overreaching and inequitable nature of 
Petitioners' position. Petitioners are happy to have cheap gas, but they are not willing to 
pay the costs required to make the cheap gas safe. The right of a utility to recover its 
reasonable costs of providing service is a fundamental premise of utility regulation. See, 
e.g., Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Comm % 885 P.2d 759, 767 (Utah 1994) (the law 
"mandates that rates produce enough revenue to pay a utility's operating expenses plus a 
reasonable return on capital invested . . . " ) . 
The Commission has found based on substantial evidence the Questar Gas has 
acted prudently today in providing coal-bed methane to its customers and in processing 
that gas during a transition period to remove C02. This is not an exception to prudence; 
it is prudence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss Petitioners' appeal or affirm 
the Commission's 2006 Order. The Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal 
because Petitioners lacked standing to seek rehearing or reconsideration of the 2006 
Order, a jurisdictional prerequisite or failed to preserve any standing they had. Even if 
they had standing, the 2006 Order was in accordance with law and substantial evidence 
supported the Commission's finding that Questar Gas was prudent in continuing to 
purchase and process coal-bed methane to the benefit of its customers and that the 
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resulting rates are just and reasonable. The Court should deny Petitioners' request for 
attorneys' fees. Their claims are without merit. 
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